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This dissertation develops the concept of joint culture by analyzing the 
experiences of military service personnel who served in joint assignments through the 
perspectives of organizational and cognitive anthropology and the application of 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews and schema analysis grounded in 
interviewee narratives. This dissertation uses a logical framework to organize and 
conduct interviews and guide the analysis of interviewee narratives. Concepts and 
themes from interviews are systematically examined following the logical framework 
to posit a set of cognitive structures associated with joint culture. At least two joint 
cultural schemas are present in the accounts of joint service that interrelate to form a 
cultural model of jointness that prepares personnel to function in a joint cultural 
environment. First, a schema of joint culture, the tacit cognitive structures focused on 
the priority of mission accomplishment that motivates personnel to work through the 
inter-organizational differences encountered in the joint environment. Second, a 
  
schema for joint culture, the more procedural or process focused explicit cognitive 
structure that informs how service personnel figure out the steps before, during and 
after a joint assignment. These schemas dynamically interrelate and are 
intersubjectively shared in adaptive ways as service personnel navigate their joint 
assignments. This dissertation finds that while military service personnel may not 
understand formal joint concepts or benefit from formal joint credit for each of their 
joint assignments, they believe joint service is valuable as an opportunity to learn 
from the other services and because of the organizational diversity that brings 
complimentary capabilities together to accomplish the mission. This dissertation adds 
to the growing body of literature that deals with anthropology of the military and may 
represent the first cognitive anthropological research into an important cultural 
context for many military personnel and illustrates how anthropological methods can 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 This dissertation is about the interplay of military service cultures when they 
come together to serve and accomplish their missions in an environment with other 
US military services, US government and non-governmental organizations and multi-
national militaries and organizations.  This mixed environment is called a “joint” 
environment and the activities that the military services perform together with these 
other organizations are known as “joint” activities. The umbrella term for the law and 
policies that govern joint assignments and activities is “jointness.”  The goal of this 
dissertation is to characterize the culture of that inter-organizational or joint 
environment. From the accounts of military service members based on their 
experiences, I have posited two cognitive structures, or schemas, that inform that 
inter-organizational or joint culture.  
As a way to begin unpacking the complexity of the cultural dynamics in these 
inter-organizational environments, this dissertation draws from a number of data 
sources. First, it draws from the DoD literature about jointness, joint operations and 
best practices and lessons learned in the joint environment. Second, it uses my own 
37+ years of experience during which I dedicated my life to the national security of 
the United States in uniform and as a civilian. Throughout that time, I served in the 
United States Air Force in multiple joint assignments and worked closely with 
military members as a DoD civilian which made me acutely aware of the cultures, 
customs and traditions of the military services. It also made me acutely aware of the 
importance of the subjects of joint duty, joint service, the perceptions some service 





data from the experiences of 10 people, some from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marines, based on their accounts of that “joint” cultural dynamic. This dissertation 
also contributes to the body of anthropological work about the military by positing 
schemas of joint culture from the US military perspective. In doing so, it adds to the 
important role anthropology can play in understanding a segment of our society and 
can be the basis for follow-on research into improving US military joint operations 
and training. 
  The concepts and theories related to organizational and cognitive 
anthropology are the approaches that were applied in this dissertation for discovering 
the characteristics contained in joint culture. These approaches allow disciplined data 
gathering through the use of a systematically developed semi-structured interview 
protocol. They also allow the situating of anthropology in a social setting dominated 
by institutional cultural norms, rigorous and thorough parent service indoctrination 
processes that create “ethnicity-like” military service cultures, and the cultural 
analysis to benefit from the author’s interpretive expertise derived from almost 40 
year living and working with the military and DoD.  The challenge in analyzing the 
cultural dynamics in a joint environment is the constantly changing composition of 
joint organizations in terms of the cross-institutional mix of members whose 
individual experiences with jointness vary widely and whose institutional systems of 
meaning can be highly focused inward toward their own institutional history, 
language, and norms of behavior.  
 The dissertation is broken down into six main chapters: Chapter 2: The 





inter-organizational relationships; Chapter 3: A Cultural Approach - the literature and 
theories of organizational and cognitive anthropology is reviewed; Chapter 4: 
Cultural Analysis and the Joint Service Experience – introduction to the Core Logic 
framework and the methods of cultural analysis and a profile of the interviewees is 
reviewed; Chapter 5: Summary of Interviews - the accounts of the 10 interviewees are 
analyzed in terms of the semi-structured interview protocol; Chapter 6: Findings – 
cultural themes from the semi-structured interviews are interpreted to form a joint 
cultural schemas; Chapter 7: Conclusions – limitations and directions for future 
research.  
In chapter two, an efficient and thorough analysis of joint inter-service 
activities from the formation of the US up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act in 1986, also known as Goldwater-Nichols is reviewed (Locker 2001). 
Goldwater-Nichols has become the metaphor for “jointness” in the military and DoD 
communities and this summary provides an analysis targeted at the subject of this 
dissertation, the inter-service cultural dynamics between the military services. 
Chapter 3 lays out the concepts and theories related to organizational and 
cognitive anthropology. These are the approaches applied in this dissertation for 
discovering the characteristics of a joint culture. The following concepts will be 
discussed in the literature review: Organizations create structures of meaning and 
regimes of instrumental rationality (Batteau 2001:726) and the ability of humans to 
adapt and function within a culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but 





come to anthropology from cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory 
(D’Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004). 
Chapter three then goes on to consider how military service indoctrination processes 
transform civilians into military service personnel in boot camp. Applying Turner’s 
account of ritual process to what people experience in basic military training, I show 
how the liminality phase of the neophyte (Turner 2008) is precisely what basic 
military trainees experience on their transition from civilian to military life after 
which they are then “reincorporated” (Turner 2008) and ready to behave in 
accordance with military standards.   
 Chapter four describes the research methods used in this dissertation: 
participant observation, semi-structured interviewing, the development of what I call 
the “Core Logic Framework”, and a profile of the sample of interviewees. Participant 
observation discusses my almost four decades of living and working with military and 
DoD personnel. I used that insider’s perspective to provide interpretive insights into 
the meaning of the dynamics of joint contexts. I chose a semi-structured interview 
data gathering approach because of the control and comparability potential it affords 
while still allowing for rich ethnographic insights that can further illuminate the 
cultural context (Bernard 2002: 205). The semi-structured interview protocol and the 
summary of interviews are both structured around the core logic framework. 
The design and purpose of core logic framework are simple. I wanted a 
systematic way to map the recurring themes expressed by military personnel have as 





profile of the interviewees in terms of their services, rank, years of service, years 
spent in joint assignments, and when they experienced their first joint assignment.  
 Chapter five is the summary of interviews structured around the core logic 
framework and is a procedural look at what military members experienced prior to 
and during joint assignments. Extended quotations are provided to illuminate 
especially salient points and where interviewees’ experiences agreed and differed 
with one another.  
 Chapter six, Findings is where the joint culture is analyzed explained. The key 
themes from interviews are summarized in the form of a cultural schemas of and for 
jointness. The two schemas are explained and then related to create a “map” of joint 
cultural knowledge.   
 Chapter seven, Conclusions covers the limitations of this research and posits 
some possible future research directions that can address those limitations or address 
the issues that service members raised with regard to jointness.  
Anthropology of the military 
 This dissertation contributes to the body of anthropology of and about the 
military from the perspective in which the military services are treated as cultural 
communities of people who live within a set of institutionally situated organizations 
and structures. This body of anthropological literature sees the military services as 
communities of people that have the same kinds of life issues that affect the rest of 
society, but in different contexts and expressed with different language. This 





applies the compassion and empathic understanding of anthropology to social 
contexts within those communities.  
To be sure, anthropology has not spent a great deal of effort understanding the 
military from the inside. As Harrell notes (2003), that is likely because of the tension 
in anthropology between two ideological positions that are somewhat at odds with 
one another; one being distrustful of the military as an institution, the other able to 
separate personal political views from the need to recognize and study the military 
from the inside (Harrell 2003a).  Even though this dissertation is written from that 
latter perspective, it is valuable and even necessary to contrast this kind of 
anthropology, an anthropology of the military with other applications of 
anthropological knowledge that are for the military.  
Applying what may become a reference taxonomy of anthropological 
engagement with the military, Lucas’s thumbnail sketch is a useful way to 
acknowledge anthropology’s opposition to some types of military-related work while 
focusing on more public and openly applied engagements designed to help the 
members of a human community that happens to be military (Lucas 2009).  
 Lucas characterizes three types of “military anthropology.” The first, which 
Lucas classifies as MA1 Anthropology of the military is where the perspectives and 
methods of anthropology are used to study the culture of the military community 
(Lucas 2009). The second, which Lucas classifies as MA2 Anthropology for the 
military is where anthropologists and the perspectives and methods of anthropology 
are put to service in support of the military (Lucas 2009). The most notable recent 





MA3 Anthropology for the military is where educational programs such as language, 
culture, and regional studies are developed such as those at the military academies 
(Lucas 2009). 
With regard to the professional and ethical concerns raised about these three 
types of anthropology, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) expressed 
concern about MA2, Anthropology for the military in the form of the Human Terrain 
System (HTS)1 (AAA 2009): 
  “Despite an often voiced personal commitment to ethics among 
particular human terrain team (HTT) social scientists, this lack of clarity regarding 
the status of HTT research and the IRB process – in short, an absence of a well-
defined ethics framework built into the program – promotes the idea that HTS 
potentially operates under a state of exception.” (AAA 2009:49) 
 
 While the AAA is concerned about MA2 or the HTS (AAA 2009:48-50), 
MA1 and MA3 are possible without violations of anthropological standards of ethical 
practice (AAA 2009:45-46, 52). This dissertation is of the type Lucas classifies as 
MA1 and under the guidance and direction of this dissertation’s committee and the 
institutional review board process of the university under which it is written. Great 
attention has been paid to avoid any breaches of ethical standards. And while the 
body of this type of anthropological work of the military is not great, one of its first 
historical examples was the work of the noted anthropologist Ralph Linton.  
In his preface to a compendium of anthropology in the military, John Hawkins 
cites Ralph Linton’s interesting insider’s insights from military service in World War 
I (WWI) as possibly the first example of a contribution to anthropology of the 
military (Linton 1924: 296-300; Hawkins 2003: ix). Linton’s account was of the 





insignia took on the symbolic importance of a closely guarded identity for tenured 
members of his unit (Linton 1924: 297-298). Outsiders were strictly prohibited from 
using the insignia and even new members of the unit had to establish seniority before 
they could wear it and identify with it (Linton 1924: 298). As an anthropologist, 
Linton considered the almost totemic significance of military unit insignia similar to 
that observed in, what at the time were referred to as “primitive groups”, that focused 
on “a clan or gentile” system (Linton 1924:300). Linton mentioned that all units that 
comprised the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF, aka the US Army forces in 
Europe during WWI) had attained unit identities that were “well defined, and often 
mutually jealous, groups each of which had its individual complex of ideas and 
observances” (Linton 1924: 299).  Those ideas and observances became for the 
members of military units “a basis for mutual understanding and tolerance and united 
all the groups against persons or organizations outside the system” (Linton 1924: 
298).  Over the ensuing 90 or so years, other anthropologists have also studied aspects 
of military life. A few examples follow. 
One important study was by Jeanne Guillemin entitled Medical Risks and the 
Volunteer Army (Guillemin 2003). Guillemin examines the refusal of some military 
personnel to participate in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) for 
troops bound for Iraq. Because the military failed to convince soldiers of the risk of 
exposure on the battlefield, they objected to being subjected to a risky vaccine whose 
long term ill effects were not known. It was because of the objections of soldiers that 
the vaccine underwent additional reviews. Ultimately the program was substantially 





In another cased, Margaret C. Harrell studied Gender- and Class-Based Role 
Expectations for Army Spouses (Harrell 2003b). Here Harrell situates current gender- 
and class-based role expectations for Army spouses in an historical context dating 
back to before the Civil War. That historical context provides important cultural 
background to the negative regard for enlisted soldiers and their wives and the 
contrastingly high regard for the aristocratic officer corps. While current obligations 
have abandoned many of the 19th century prejudices, there is still a social caste in 
which officer’s spouses (wives) are expected to volunteer for the benefit of the unit, 
whereas enlisted spouses are simply expected to not present difficulties and are 
perceived consistent with a class-based stereotype of lack of intelligence, immorality 
and being uneducated. (Harrell 2003b:69-94) 
 This dissertation is another contribution to a small, but growing body of 
anthropology of the military. It frames, for the first time, an important issue affecting 
the military services in an inter-service cultural context and may help identify aspects 
of the problem that can be addressed in a targeted way. The implication is not that 
one or the other culture needs to be changed, but that framing jointness as a cultural 
setting may enable the military services to better prepare members for joint 
assignments. Of course how to prepare them remains to be discovered. However, 
defining jointness or joint service as a cultural context could add to the discussion 
about cultural competency education and training elements that specifically deal with 






Chapter 2: History of Jointness 
 
 On 1 October 1986, the Congress of the United States passed Public Law 99-
433 also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986, a moment regarded as the beginning of the concept and doctrine of 
“jointness” in military history. This law, which was an amendment to Title 10 of the 
United States Code (USC - the permanent laws of the United States), referred to as 
simply “Goldwater-Nichols” within the DoD, marked the beginning of a new era in 
the history of the DoD. Among other things the law did was:   
  ESTABLISHMENT. —The Secretary of Defense shall establish 
policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly 
trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters” (US Congress 99-433 Section 401 
Chapter 38 Section 661, 1986) 
 
A critical effect of Goldwater-Nichols on the culture of the DoD was its emphasis on 
the concept of “jointness” or “joint matters”: 
 From 10 USC 99-433 sec. 668: Joint Matters- 
“(1) …the term "joint matters" means matters related to the achievement of 
unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains 
such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including 
matters relating to-(A) national military strategy; (B) strategic planning and 
contingency planning; (C) command and control of operations under unified 
command; (D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the 
United States; or (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations. 
(2) In the context of joint matters, the term "integrated military forces" refers to 
military forces that are involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations 
involving participants from-(A) more than one military department; or (B) a military 
department and one or more of the following: (i) Other departments and agencies of 
the United States. (ii) The military forces or agencies of other countries. (iii) Non-
governmental persons or entities.”   
 
While the definition within the law is exhaustive, the terminology within the 





 To appreciate the impact of jointness on the military service cultures of the 
DoD, one must appreciate the fact that the highly independent individual military 
services were now compelled to work together in ways previously unimagined. Mr. 
James Locker, a US Military Academy (known as West Point) graduate and 
professional Senate Armed Services Committee staff member, has written a useful 
analysis of Goldwater-Nichols that addresses some of the US military’s history, long 
standing inter-service rivalries and operational failures that led to Goldwater-Nichols 
(Locker 2001). While an exhaustive history of the US military is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, Locker appropriately selects important aspects of that history that are 
relevant to the concept of jointness. 
 From the founding of the nation until 1942, the US military (no DoD existed 
yet) consisted of two entirely separate military service departments, the Navy with its 
culture of decentralized organization relying on cooperation and coordination and the 
Army (known then as the Department of War) that favored more centralized control 
(Locker 2001:95-96). It was not until 1942 that President Roosevelt created what we 
now know as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS also known as the Joint Chiefs) by 
executive decision and that was done primarily to work effectively with the British, 
who already had a combined chiefs of staff organization, during World War II 
(WWII) (Locker 2001: 96). Along with the JCS, President Roosevelt’s executive 
decision created a new organizational construct in response to Pearl Harbor known as 
the “Unified Theater Commands.” These two changes challenged the 150-year 
cultures of independent operation enjoyed by the two halves of our national defense. 





through the Joint Chiefs and they had to report to supreme commanders in the major 
theaters of war. 
There were two theaters during WWII and were led by General Eisenhower in 
Europe and General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific and these theaters 
were subordinate to the JCS. This is a subtle, but important, point of cultural import. 
Remember, the JCS was comprised of representatives from the two military 
departments with their inter-service competitions and rivalries alive and well. The 
unifying construct, the Unified Theater Commands, which was supposed to bring 
some cooperation to the war effort, was subordinate to and susceptible to the same 
inter-service dysfunction that was the rationale for its creation in the first place. This 
tension was felt most profoundly in the Pacific theater where because of inter-service 
tension, the Unified Theater principle essentially failed and the theater was divided 
into two commands, one Army (led by MacArthur) and one Navy (led by Nimitz) 
(Locker 2001: 96). It was not until after WWII that the Department of Defense was 
created, the Secretary of Defense as a cabinet position was established as the principal 
advisor to the President on defense matters and the three separate service departments 
we have today were created (Army, Navy including the Marine Corps, and Air Force) 
(Locker 2001:96; DoD 1978:22-35).  
Important to the concept of jointness was the fact that it was not until 1958 
that the theater commands, at the time called “Unified and Specified Commands” 
were directly subordinated to the Secretary of Defense and no longer under the 
operational control of the military services (DoD 1978: 190). Even though the 





empowering of the Unified and Specified Commands, for the first time the concept of 
inter-service cooperation and integration could be pursued without service 
parochialisms standing the direct line of operational control. However, what looked 
good on paper remained largely stagnant because while the services no longer 
controlled the Commands, they still controlled their respective service resources and 
personnel and they never fully complied with strengthening the Unified commanders 
(Locker 2001:99). From 1958 to 1983, the DoD remained virtually unchanged and 
because of the on-going service resistance to joint operations and command, there 
were several operational setbacks. Of particular note was the failed Iranian hostage 
rescue in 1980 (Locker 2001: 99).  
 An important example of how the lack of jointness tragically failed was the 
1980 attempted rescue of US hostages held in Iran. Referred to as “Operation Eagle 
Claw,” the operation involved Marine Corps helicopters, Air Force fixed wing 
refueling aircraft, and Army commandos and was expected to be a coordinated 
operation, but this was in the era before the concept of joint operations was part of 
standing DoD policy, doctrine or training let alone incorporated into the individual 
service cultures. Regardless of whatever aspirations planners had for the participants 
in the operations to execute their responsibilities cooperatively, the participating units 
trained separately, met for the first time in the deserts of Iran, had no shared 
command and control procedures, no visible identification, no compatible radios, no 
agreed upon plan, and no single clear line of authority to an overall commander 
(Locker 2001:100). So when the desert sands of Iran caused poor visibility and one of 





ensuing crash and explosion cost the lives of eight service members and the entire 
operation to be abandoned. In the process of abandoning the operation, secret 
documents, weapons, and communications gear were compromised (Locker 
2001:100).  
As tragic as the failed Iranian hostage rescue was, and its inclusion here is in 
no way meant to denigrate the loss of those heroic service members, it was also a 
very public example of the failure of the military to work together, a failure to 
embrace jointness.  Then, in 1982, the Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones, 
testified before congress that his efforts to reform the JCS from within had failed and 
that Congress was going to have to mandate the necessary reforms (Locker 
2001:101).  Goldwater-Nichols resulted about three years later. 
Over the past 30 years since Goldwater-Nichols, the DoD has reminded 
everyone about the need for more cooperation and collaboration, in other words, more 
jointness. The primary document used to advance the policy of jointness is the JCS 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Last updated in 2011, JP 3-0:  
 “reflects the current guidance for conducting joint activities across the range 
of military operations and is the basis for U.S. participation in multinational 
operations where the United States has not ratified specific doctrine or procedures. 
This keystone publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes 
the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.” 
 
Joint Operations covers everything from understanding the national security 
environment to organizing for and planning operations. This dissertation is focused 
on the portion of Joint Functions that the DoD refers to as “creating shared 







Figure 2.1: from Joint Publication 3-0: Creating Shared Understanding (JP 3-0: 
III-12) 
 From JP 3-0: “Creating Shared Understanding. In one sense, decisions are 
the most important products of the C2 (Command and Control) function, because 
they guide the force toward objectives and mission accomplishment. Commanders 
and staff require not only information to make these decisions, but also the 
knowledge and understanding that results in the wisdom essential to sound decision 





 It is clear from JP 3-0 that collaboration and jointness are still goals for the 
DoD. It is interesting to note, however, that the section Creating Shared 
Understanding was not part of joint doctrine until the 2011 revision (DoD 2011c: iii). 
So the narrative of the need to create a climate, a culture that encourages and 
embraces shared understanding is a fairly recent development in the long history of 
the DoD joint cultural transformation. However, since its addition to JP 3-0 in 2011, 
the DoD has been consistent in repeating the narrative that the DoD needs to continue 
the transformation toward an environment of shared understanding as part of the 
concept of jointness and joint operations in its Insights and Best Practices Focus 
Papers series (DoD 2007; 2011; 2013b-j; 2014b). These papers are developed by the 
joint staff through “regular contact and dialog” (DoD 2017) with joint units and 
shared across the DoD as examples of best practices.  
 By all accounts, the goal of jointness is for future military operations to be 
integrated in a cross-domain (meaning across military services) way with an 
increasing emphasis on shared context of understanding among participants. There is 
a clear statement in the “Mission Command White Paper” by the then Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Martin Dempsey (DoD 2012c: 3), that the 
future of military operations will require smaller units at the tactical level operating in 
a decentralized way. General Dempsey points out that the need for an increasingly 
decentralized reliance on small units (which tend to be units composed of lower 
ranking personnel) at the tactical level will increase the need to “create jointness 
deeper and sooner in the force.” The DoD acknowledges that sometimes mission 





subordinate levels in decision making that affects mission operations (DoD 2013:3). 
But joint doctrine as well as other supporting documents like General Dempsey’s 
white paper and DoD best practices increasingly interpret jointness as an 
acknowledgement that the dynamic contexts of current and future military operations 
require lower level and lower ranking personnel to be trained in joint concepts.   
The DoD has a stated need for military members to reflect more broadly on 
the contexts of modern national security operations (DoD 2013b-j; 2011c) and there 
has been a move toward a more unified, coordinated and collaborative application of 
military power (Locker 2001). However, there remain deep-seated cultural 












Chapter 3: Cultural Approach 
 
The concepts and theories related to organizational and cognitive 
anthropology are the approaches that will be applied in this dissertation for 
discovering the characteristics of a joint culture. The following concepts will be 
discussed in the literature review below: 
 Organizations create structures of meaning and regimes of instrumental 
rationality (Batteau 2001:726). The ability of humans to adapt and function within a 
culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but implicit knowledge structures, also 
known as cultural models, the principles of which come to anthropology from 
cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory (D’Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; 
Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004). 
Organizations Create Structures of Meaning 
Anthropology’s contribution to the study of organizations and organizational 
culture is important background for the research in this dissertation because 
organizations create structures of meaning and regimes of instrumental rationality 
(Batteau 2001:726). Anthropology has demonstrated that organizational culture is a 
blending of the cultures employees bring into the organization combined with the 
meanings and artifacts already present inside the organization. The result is a 
dynamic renegotiation of meaning and culture and this presents opportunities to 
challenge old ways of doing things and habits of thought (Batteau 2001:726).     
Anthropology’s multi-national origins and international collaborations have 
made important and on-going contributions to the understanding of social structure 





notable use of anthropology to industrial research with the work of W. Lloyd Warner, 
during the 1920’s on the Hawthorne Studies, using functionalist techniques from 
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (Jordan 2003:10) (Hamada 1994:9-27). The lessons 
from the Hawthorne studies were that Warner, through the application of 
anthropological fieldwork techniques, found that the shop floor was an interconnected 
social system that had strong control over worker behavior. The social system’s 
behavioral control had implications for incentive systems that management tried to 
put in place (Wright 1994:6). It is interesting to note that Warner’s students at 
Harvard went on to found the Society for Applied Anthropology (SfAA). Another of 
Warner’s student and collaborator on Hawthorne was Burleigh Gardner (1902-1985) 
who looked at a business organization as a socio-cultural system within the larger 
society (Hamada 1994:10-12).  
In addition to the early work of anthropology in organizational settings, it is 
important to appreciate different perspectives on the concept of organization because 
when some people use the word organization, they may mean different things. One 
notable difference is between the concepts of “organization” as defined by Scott 
(1998) and that offered by Firth (1954).  
 First and foremost, the definition offered by Scott is as follows: 
 “Organizations are social structures created by individuals to support 
collaborative pursuit of specified goals.” (Scott 1998: 10) 
This definition differs from that offered by Firth when discussing social 
organization and social structure: 
 “a structural system is concerned with a system of social positions, and 






Scott seems to be saying that when classifying human collective behavior, the 
organization is the super-ordinate category that encompasses the structure and all 
other elements as well. Firth seemed to see structure (relationships) and organization 
(activities) as parallel, different ways or perspectives to describe collective human 
behavior, neither one being more important or above the other.  
 This distinction may seem small, but Scott is taking a social situation 
(Spradley 1980:39) comprised of relationships of people, activities, and artifacts and 
calling the whole thing an organization. Firth would look at that same social situation 
and, of the many ways to describe it, have the relationships (structure) and on-going 
activities (organization) within it and around it as available perspectives. To 
anthropologists, like Firth, the interplay of all of the elements in the social situation 
are potentially equally significant to interpreting, understanding and describing its 
purpose, meaning and significance to the people involved and the question to be 
answered or problem to be solved (Spradley 1980:45). It is the role of participant 
observation in the study of organizations and their cultures or perhaps more to the 
point, the relative priority of purposive proximity that results in gradual socialization 
and enculturation as a means of understanding and thickly describing, 
ethnographically, the local knowledge of behavior in an organized human behavior 
setting (Spradley 1980:3-25; Dewalt et al 2000:259-265; Geertz 2000:9-10). It is 
interesting to note, that in Scott’s account of Hawthorne, Elton Mayo and the Human 
Relations School (Scott 1998:61-63), no mention is made of the industrial 
anthropological contribution of W. Lloyd Warner (Hamada 1994:11). Instead, the 





(Hamada 1994:11) are characterized as a social-psychological “informal structures” 
(Scott 1998: 62). Contemporary cognitive anthropologists might call those “informal 
structures” cultural models or cultural schemas. 
Cognitive Anthropology and Cultural Models 
 The term “cultural model” describes the concept that the ability of humans to 
adapt and function within a culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but 
implicit knowledge structures, also known as cultural models, the principles of which 
come to anthropology from cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory 
(D’Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004). Cultural 
models have become devices that anthropologists use to capture the tacit portions of 
knowledge domains as part of larger attempts to describe context-specific human 
behavior and meaning. There is some variability with which the terms “schema” and 
“cultural models” are used or are familiar to the reader. This dissertation uses the 
definitions of “schema” and “cultural model” taken from D’Andrade’s “ontology of 
cultural forms” (D’Andrade 1992: 179-180): 
 “Schema – the organization of cognitive elements into an abstract mental 
object capable of being held in working memory with default values or open slots 
which can be variously filled in with appropriate specifics. For example, most 
Americans have a well-formed schema for a commercial transaction in which a buyer 
and seller exchange money for the rights over some object.” 
 
 “Model – a schema or interrelated set of cognitive schemas used to represent 
something, to reason with or to calculate from by mentally manipulating the parts of 
the model to solve some problem.”  
 
Further, and a key element of the difference between a schema and a cultural model is 






As people live their lives and move through this kaleidoscope of constantly 
changing contexts, they carry with them implicit general sets of knowledge that equip 
them to function within each context as it was the last time they experienced it. The 
pattern of the memory of life’s ever-changing contexts is laid down in mental 
structures that enable the recognition of what has become routine or familiar and it is 
this notion of recognition based on prior experience is the central tenet of schema 
theory and cultural models theory (Mandler 1984; D’Andrade 1987). But few humans 
are capable of retaining detailed accounts of each and every experience. Schemas 
provide the answer in the form of hidden simplified cognitively-stored patterns that 
enable recognition (D’Andrade 1992). These simplified structures also equip people 
to solve new problems in each context or in totally new contexts because each person 
can tap into their version of that knowledge and repurpose it to meet new demands 
(D’Andrade, 1992). A schema becomes a cultural model when it is intersubjectively 
shared (D’Andrade, 1987). Notable alternative interpretations of the concept of 
cultural models have been offered by Shore, Kronenfeld, Hutchins and Atran et. al. 
and they will be discussed briefly below. 
 Shore (1996), who was concerned about how shared a model must be to 
qualify as a cultural model, expanded upon D’Andrade’s sharedness concept by 
drawing a distinction between individual mental models and instituted cultural 
models2. But because, as Shore put it, humans are “opportunistic and creative model 
builders and model readers of great virtuosity” (Shore 1996:46), relative to the shared 
experience, each person subconsciously develops his or her own individual mental 





intermediate, quasi individual quasi institutional model is the conventional cognitive 
model (Shore 1996:47). Shore describes individual mental models as idiosyncratic 
because they are not shared, in their details, by others in the community, but there are 
stock social concepts that are individualized. The institutional models have public 
objectification like formal rituals (Shore 1996:52). Shore contrasts the dynamic, 
changeable, and detailed nature of individual models with societal cultural models 
that he describes as emerging gradually, are slow to change, and by contrast with 
personal models, and are less detailed (Shore 1996:52).  
According to Kronenfeld (2008), people acquire these implicit context-
specific cultural models from the moment they are born as they grow, learn, explore, 
develop, adapt and mature. Kronenfeld further positions cultural models in the larger 
cultural context in that culture and language are epiphenomenal but that individuals 
rely on them as if they actually exist and that the individual representations of the 
presumed collective representations can vary in detail and specificity (2008:68). It is 
shared experience and interactive and communicative interdependence that keeps the 
individual representations close enough to function as a distributed cognitive system. 
He identifies three kinds of cultural cognitive structures: 1. Cultural conceptual 
systems that organize abstract knowledge, 2. Cultural models are abstract, general 
models that provide scenarios for how to behave or interpret the behavior of others, 
and 3. Cultural models of thought that provide the basic presumptions about how the 
world is organized as a device for breaking down and organizing unfamiliar problems 





Kronenfeld defines cultural models as abstract plans relating context-specific 
skills, knowledge, goals, values, perceptions, emotional states, etc. to actions. When 
cultural models are triggered, at first they are general with only generic detail and do 
not automatically apply to any specific situation until instantiated (Kronenfeld 
2008:69). Even after instantiation, they are still general in nature and several may be 
considered for any situation making up what Kronenfeld calls a “kit bag” of scenarios 
linked to different scenarios that people can apply as needed (Kronenfeld 2008:70).  
Cultural models can be used in everyday life if they are dynamic and constantly 
changing and act like a reference library and are inferred anew as individuals 
experience the world around them (Kronenfeld 2008:72). Cultural models enable 
effective interaction in a given cultural context. 
Hutchins (1995) has been one of the leading proponents of cautioning against 
an in-the-mind-only view of human-cultural cognition. He has shown that cultural 
cognition and therefore human cognition is a process that is more than the 
manipulation of symbols inside a person’s head. Culture, in Hutchins’ view: 
“…is a process, and the “things” that appear on the list-like definitions of 
culture are residua of the process. Culture is an adaptive process that accumulates 
partial solutions to frequently encountered problems…culture, context, and 
history…These things are fundamental aspects of human cognition…” (Hutchins 
1995: 354) 
 
Hutchins’ view is that studying human cultural cognition should be done with a view 
to the larger process environment within which cognition takes place (Hutchins 
1995:365-374).  
Atran et al (2005) offer a related perspective to the study of cognition in their 





conceptualizations may affect the way those populations behave toward nature. Atran 
et al claim that how we define culture may not be the best guide to how to study it 
(Atran et al 2005:745). In fact, Atran et al want to develop an approach that guards 
against potential conceptual definitional biases and works toward identifying the 
causal processes involved in the dynamic relationship between cultural knowledge 
and observed behaviors (Atran et al 2005:745). Atran et al are perfectly comfortable 
with the notion that cultural ideas and beliefs may not be shared. Their approach still 
looks for informant agreement, but their view is that there may be knowledge shared 
only among a privileged group. Too narrow a focus on agreement, in their view, 
“directs attention away from understanding the dynamic nature of social processes.” 
(2005:745) Atran et al summarize their position that: 
 “the systematic distribution of ideas and behaviors, or cultural path, results 
from the integration of distinct cognitive, behavioral, and ecological constraints that 
neither reside wholly within the mind nor are recognizable in a world without minds. 
Cultural paths do not exist apart from individual minds that constitute them and the 
environments that constrain them, any more than a physical path exists apart from the 
organisms that tread it and the surrounding ecology that restricts its location and 
course” (2005:754). 
From Civilian to Military Cultural Models 
The preceding conversation about mental schema and cultural models and 
how they form is fundamentally what occurs in the processes of socialization and 
enculturation early in life. I maintain that a similar process occurs later in life like 
when adults make the decision to enter the military, they are socialized and 
enculturated anew. This time into a new society, a new ethnicity, that of their parent 
military service. Drawing on Herskovits, the two processes of socialization and 





internalizing the beliefs of that society. Socialization is “the process by means of 
which an individual is integrated into his society.” (Herskovits 1967: 23) Whereas 
enculturation is “in essence a process of conscious and unconscious conditioning, 
exercised within the limits sanctioned by a given body of custom.” (Herskovits 1967: 
24). 
These processes of socialization and enculturation are common to all human 
beings and are an unavoidable part of being human. In fact, they are so endemic to the 
human experience they occur without notice to each and every one of us as we live 
our lives and embrace the people, places and behaviors of our immediate 
surroundings. As humans mature, the cultural models that result from early life 
become so conditioned that new forms of behavior can constitute a cultural change 
(Herskovits 1967: 25). Yet, mature individuals can change their cultural models by 
deciding to make a change, by deciding to reinvent themselves.  
One way cultural models can change is when a person chooses a life path that 
sends them in a new direction that is a departure from where they started. The 
affirmative decision to make the change can be a life-altering one. The change can 
have consequences that challenge previously well-established social groupings, 
norms of behavior and even language itself. The breaking down of the established 
cultural model the individual has built over their early life requires a new 
socialization process; new language, new behaviors, new places and things, and new 
rules governing acceptable participation in a new social milieu. The incorporation and 
adaptation of one's existing cultural model into the new social context requires the 





already passed through as children. Joining the military as an adult is one such life 
changing transformation. 
 The transformation from civilian to military life is roughly the same for all 
military services in terms of its ritual significance and general components. What 
separates the services are their different histories, missions, cultures and traditions. 
Those service specific characteristics are socialized in surprisingly similar ways and 
with the results being that once a person passes through the initial socialization 
process, they are of course a member of the armed forces of the United States, but 
they are first and foremost a member of that military service. That socialization 
begins and is most profound, in boot camp. 
 Boot camp, is also known as basic combat training in the Army, basic 
military training in the Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard, and boot camp in the 
Navy. Viewed through the lens of a ritual socialization process as described by 
Turner (2008: 94-95), boot camp is an intense period of separation from familiar 
social groups and norms of behavior, descent into a liminal period of military 
initiation and conditioning as a neophyte basic trainee, followed by a reemergence 
culminating in graduation from boot camp with all the rights and obligations that 
come with acceptance into the military. In this sense, boot camp truly is a rite of 
passage.  
As a ritual process, initiation into military life at boot camp begins with a 
complete separation from all of the trappings of civilian life. Symbolically, this is 
represented by the placing into storage all civilian attire and belongings the new 





issuance of a starter military uniform that is completely devoid of any symbols of 
rank, status, or achievement that will be acquired throughout their upcoming military 
careers. This first uniform is labeled with the trainee’s name and their service 
signifying that they have entered their service at the lowest level with no status other 
than membership. Each trainee also receives a haircut to further standardize their 
appearance. Male trainees now look like one another and female trainees a similarly 
uniform haircut is given although not as short as the men.  
The ritual value of storage personal civilian belongings, donning the same 
blank uniform, and wearing the same gender-specific haircut is to immediately 
reinforce uniformity of appearance and status while in basic training. As Turner 
describes it, those in this liminal state “have nothing that may distinguish them from 
their fellow neophytes or initiands” (Turner 2008: 95).  The military services are 
stripping away the trappings of civilian life each basic trainee is being quickly 
indoctrinated into the material, social and behavioral aspects of their new military 
service culture.  
Each trainee will be “fashioned anew” (Turner 2008: 95) with the service 
specific training and experiences their parent service has designed to create Soldiers, 
Sailors, Airmen or Marines. Neophyte basic trainees experience what Turner 
describes as intense comradeship or “communitas” in their shared lowly status (2008: 
96). Their experiences in boot camp: 
“the ordeals and humiliations, often of a grossly physiological 
character, to which neophytes are submitted represent partly a destruction of 
the previous status and partly a tempering of their essence in order to prepare 
them to cope with their new responsibilities and restrain them in advance from 






The cultural blank slate that is created through the separation, liminality and trials of 
basic training is filled with service-specific doctrine and training that shapes the 
trainee’s cultural model of what it means to be a member of a given branch of the 
armed forces. Each trainee learns what it means to be a soldier, sailor, airman or 
marine. These lessons are reinforced from then on as the trainee graduates from basic 
training and is expected “to behave in accordance with certain customary norms and 
ethical standards binding on incumbents of social position in a system of such 
positions” (Turner 2008: 95). So while the services socialize in similar ways, the 
content of the training and indoctrination is very service specific about what it means 
to be a member of that service.  
 A comprehensive description of the military services is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. The basic differences have to do with each service’s domain of 
operation, where they fight and how. But simply listing the characteristics of those 
domains fails to illuminate the criticality of the fact that it is the systems of meaning 
and customary norms (Turner 2008: 95) endogenous to each military service that are 
socialized and enculturated in the ritual of boot camp and are reinforced throughout a 
military member’s career. The resulting differences appear in specific contexts where 
the services have to negotiate those differences together, like in a joint environment.  
 The decision to join the military is a life changing decision. The military is 
analogous to a separate society, a separate culture and some might say a separate 
ethnicity with the common threads of heritage, customs, and values that are unique to 
a group of people (Daley 2000: 291-303). But the military is not monolithic in the 





military services. Instead, it is my assertion that through the differential military 
service socialization processes, individuals acculturate into separate cultures and 
become members of, what may be usefully referred to separate military “ethnicities.” 
The way Omohundro defines the term “ethnicity” is useful for emphasizing the 
contrasts between the services that they themselves continually reinforce: 
“The ethnic group invests effort to distinguish itself from others in the wider 
society…Ethnic group members are also aware of their group identity and 
distinctiveness, and they usually invest effort to foster such awareness in themselves 
and their fellow citizens.” (Omohundro 2008: 31) 
Maybe by considering the services as ethnicities, as Daley suggested, new 
analytical lenses can be applied to the dynamics of multi-service jointness. If we 
apply Jenkins’s standard anthropological model of ethnicity (2008: 14) as a 
framework for considering what we know about military indoctrination, it is plausible 
to conclude that the separate military services can be thought of as “ethnicities.”  
Jenkins states that ethnicity (all quotations below are from Jenkins 2008: 14):   
“Ethnicity is a matter of cultural differentiation – a dialectical interplay 
between similarity and difference.” 
 
“Ethnicity is centrally a matter of shared meanings – produced and reproduced 
during interaction.”  
 
 “Ethnicity is no more fixed or unchanging than the way of life of which it is 
an aspect, or the situations in which it is produced and reproduced.”  
 
“Ethnicity, as an identification, is collective and individual, externalized in 
social interaction and the categorization of others, and internalized in personal self-
identification.”  
 
Military ethnicities modify a person's existing civilian cultural models to 
enable successful behavior in new military service social contexts. The separate 





member of a specific service, what it means in that military service to be a member of 
the other military services, and possibly even what it means to work in a joint context. 
So when we think about the cultures of the military services in joint contexts, we are 
considering more than differences in uniform or rank insignia even though those are 
important. We are thinking about the artifacts of a process of transformation and 
adaptation that each military member went through as a former civilian based on a 
decision they made to begin a new life in the military service of their choice.  
We may not know why the military services evolved over time to take the 
views they do. Maybe it is because the services truly are culturally distinct enough 
and continually emphasize the inter-service differences to be considered ethnicities. 
If we accept that from the anthropological model of ethnicity provided by Jenkins 
(Jenkins 2008), and Omohundro’s definition (Omohundro 2008), then we could make 
a strong case that the military services could be thought of as separate ethnicities. It 
should come as no surprise then that the within service shared meanings and ways of 
life would impact each service member’s service-specific cultural model.  
Specifically, impacted would be how the military services learn and how they reflect 
upon information. Or to bring this thought closer to the problem of jointness, how the 
services would entertain ideas from other services. How receptive they are to 
alternatives or in other words, how the services view information and analysis. 
 While available literature on the perspectives the services with regard to 
information, analysis of options, and critical dialog about decisions is limited, Builder 
analyzed the information and operations analysis styles of the services in a study for 





formal analysis, they used it in different ways and for different purposes. Builder’s 
analysis (see Appendix E for a list of Builder’s descriptions) found that the Air Force 
is the most comfortable with analysis and so much so that it is used to support 
decisions of all kinds, not just those related to formalized planning, programming, or 
budgeting processes (Builder 1989: 104-105). The Army, on the other hand, seems 
more concerned about getting a single answer rather than illuminating alternatives 
(Builder 1989: 105-106). The Navy seems more concerned with confirming Naval 
experience, traditions, and institutional judgment rather than evaluating the Navy 
(Builder 1989: 106-107). These three approaches to analysis could have important 
ramifications for team learning and collaboration in an inter-service environment.  
If each service does not have a tradition of open-minded information analysis 
that may challenge the status quo, there may be friction if a team member has 
alternatives to a finding or conclusion. Or the converse may occur where a team 
member does not question a decision, at the appropriate time of course and not in 
violation of orders, because that member does not come from a tradition of debate 
based on valid analysis of possibilities. It would seem that the whole point of 
jointness is to avoid doctrinaire solutions and learn from the diversity of ideas present 
in the joint context. Level of comfort with analysis as a way to adjudicate complex 
problems would seem to indicate a willingness to listen to alternatives that may even 
go against service traditions or be more grey than black and white. Trust may become 
an issue for members whose service tradition may not have prepared them for such a 





is leading to an answer that indicates one’s parent service may need to change the 
way it does certain things? 
Summary 
 
 This dissertation applies the perspectives from organizational and cognitive 
anthropology to the study of joint culture. Organizational anthropology contributes an 
important perspective that views the organization as an environment that creates 
structures of meaning that are dynamically renegotiated between employees and the 
organization. Cognitive anthropology provides the perspective that humans develop 
and retain cognitive structures based on experience that enable them to function as 
they encounter it. This study also acknowledges that the military services’ ritual 
indoctrination processes and their differential appreciation for critical information 
analysis and debate can create self-reinforced separations between the services that 





Chapter 4: Cultural Analysis of the Joint Service Experience 
 As I mentioned above, the ethnographic research in this dissertation looks at 
what military service members experienced in their multi-service and multi-agency 
assignments. My research methods fall into three broad categories, participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and the interpretation of findings. This mixed 
approach is designed to leverage a life-long career of complete participation that 
identified the research question as well as allowed a targeted examination of reference 
materials in the publicly available DoD library. Semi-structured interviews were a 
vital part of the research to provide empirical data from military members who 
experienced joint assignments and their account is vital to the credibility of the results 
of this research.  
Participant Observation3 as an insider 
I have worked in the DoD as an active duty Air Force military service member 
and as a DoD civilian civil service employee for a combined period of over 37 years. 
I have dedicated my life to the national security of the United States in uniform and as 
a civilian. Throughout that time, I worked closely with military members from all of 
the four services consulted in this dissertation. That close and continuing contact with 
the military has made me acutely aware of the cultures, customs and traditions of all 
four services. It also made me acutely aware of the importance of the subjects of joint 
duty, joint service, the perceptions some service members hold of the other services. 
That experience also includes the almost axiomatic, occasional and fleeting, 
frustration service members feel with the bureaucracy of the military and the DoD.  





with life in the DoD as it likely is in any profession. Having been so immersed in 
DoD and military cultures for so long, my role as an ethnographer of the military is 
one of an insider or complete or ordinary participant (Spradley 1980:61) (Dewalt and 
Dewalt 1998: 263). Bernard cautions that aspiring to become a complete participant 
can be a deception if used to disguise the fact that one is doing research (Bernard 
2002: 327). As I was already a complete participant before embarking on research 
and all of my interviewees knew me in my professional DoD capacity, my 
participation status was not an attempt to hide my research.  
I was in the military as an occupation and life choice and came to 
anthropology later. I say this so as not to imply some kind of undeclared status as a 
researcher masquerading as a native. There are legitimate ethical concerns that can be 
raised by such behavior (Bernard 2002). Instead, I feel I can legitimately claim the 
title of insider. It was after almost four decades of military and DoD service that I 
spent the years in university to learn the theory and methods of anthropology and to 
hone my perception about the dynamic socio-cultural contexts that are the military 
from the perspectives of anthropology.  
 My status as an insider means I understand how to navigate the DoD and 
military bureaucracies and their rules and protocols. I have, in a sense, expert 
knowledge within the limits of my own training and experience. In my experience, 
the informal military social bond is built from a combination of common service 
experiences, occupational specialties, assignments, or other duty. If one is planning to 
write about the experiences of military personnel, a level of solidarity with shared 





genuinely empathic understanding that comes from a life choice of actual military 
duty. Also, respecting the position and rank of the person with whom you are 
interacting is a must. As a civilian, as I am now, knowledge of and respect for 
traditions and protocols are what convinces colleagues of one’s credibility and 
trustworthiness. However, it is important to know a lot without being a know-it-all. In 
my experience, humility in one’s own ability while still confident in purpose are the 
hallmarks of the military ethos.  
Military members respect clarity of purpose, relevance of one’s mission, and 
competency in its execution. These are also the characteristics of good research. So, 
translating the objectives of this dissertation’s research into a context acceptable to 
the military was made easier by my insider’s perspective. That perspective also 
allowed me to identify jointness as an issue of concern to many people who serve and 
to gain their support in conducting my research. And of course, those years of 
participation with the military informed my choice of research focus and led to my 
selection of military-related documents and the crafting of my semi-structured 
interview questions.  
The professional literature of the DoD that informed the research direction of 
this dissertation is a somewhat arcane corpus of DoD government publications and 
relevant military-related journal articles. I say arcane only because it is not a library 
of which many people avail themselves, inside the military or out. But for the 
purposes of understanding DoD goals and actions with regard to joint duty, 
government publications serve not only to inform this research, they also serve as 





publicly available, on-line resources that contain the joint doctrine, policies and best 
practices relevant to joint service that influence the experiences of service members in 
joint assignments.  
Semi-structured Interviews  
Semi-structured interviewing provides what is a highly interpretive insider’s 
ethnographic account of military service with a systematic approach to the study of 
joint service. While my personal experience with the military has allowed me to 
identify an issue of importance to the military, semi-structured interviewing added 
rigor and comparability as well as using my interviewees time efficiently (Bernard 
2002:205). Comparability is achieved by following the protocol’s questions and 
pursuing opportunities for the interviewee to explain (Bernard 2002:205) the 
sequential moments from when they were notified about their joint assignment, the 
preparation for it, and their reactions to it upon arrival. Joint assignments are fit into 
the normal flow of assignments throughout one’s military career, but they also add 
complexity to a military member’s professional progression within their parent 
service. The semi-structured interview protocol was constructed specifically to focus 
on those challenges. Anyone wishing to verify and validate my findings need only 
implement the interview guide (see Appendix C) to produce comparable data across 
interviewees.  
Core logic – A framework for analyzing joint experiences 
 In this dissertation, I am examining the processes of recruitment, preparation 
for and service in joint assignments with other services, agencies and nationalities. 





core logic of this dissertation (see Figure 2 below). The term “core logic” helps to 
unpack the general categories of experiences all military members have from before 
arriving at a joint assignment to the on-site experiences while at the duty station 
through the member’s perceptions of the joint assignment that result in a perceived 
value of jointness. While each service member’s personal experiences are unique, the 
core logic framework creates a structure within which to position the interaction of 
events and responses that are the subject of this research.   
Figure 4.1: The core logic framework 
 
The core logic framework is structured in a loop of dynamic cultural 
influences that together act as a kind of roadmap to the key elements of joint service 
that I have learned are important to the members of the armed forces. The core logic 
drove the development of the semi-structured interview protocol and formed the 
general outline for identifying patterns in interview responses. The core logic consists 
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of four parts that encompass the stages of joint service: Causes, Effects, Impacts, and 
Adaptations.  
Causes 
 In this dissertation, the concept of “causes” is meant to be the things that 
produce an effect. In the case of joint service, these are the experience prior to the 
joint assignment. Another way to think about it is that causes are each service 
member’s career experiences prior to and arrival on site at a joint assignment which is 
a “joint” socio-cultural context comprised of members from multiple different 
services, agencies or nationalities. Causes or prior experiences includes how each 
member’s parent service advocated for joint assignments, selected members to serve 
in joint assignments and it includes the training and preparation service members 
receive prior to and after arrival at their joint assignment. These experiences 
surrounding the move to a joint context require each service member to individually 
adapt their service-specific systems of meaning based on experience and training to 
understand, and collaborate in the joint context for the achievement of stated and 
(presumably) shared military goals.  
My experience with the military has shown me that in addition to doing their 
jobs proficiently and professionally, military members spend a lot of time planning 
for or recovering from permanent changes of station or PCS moves. In other words, 
they move, a lot, and moving consumes a great deal of time and attention. Also a PCS 
move is more than a plane ride. It is the preparation before the move which 
sometimes includes influencing where one will be moving, but most of the time the 





and if the member’s family is coming along, all of the health, educational, and 
housing needs have to been considered and arrangements made for the family at the 
new duty station. After arrival at the new location, the member has to get settled at 
their new unit while the family has to get settled into a new life. This issue of PCSing, 
as it is known, and its impact on the lives of military members and their families is 
probably the one common area of shared experience across all branches of the 
military that creates the greatest sense of camaraderie and solidarity. However, it is a 
member’s military service that provides the stability during this time of personal 
upheaval. 
Within each military service, the familiarity of service norms and traditions 
are an important socio-cultural anchor throughout the PCS process. The “ADCON”, 
short for administrative control, is the parent service administrative organizational 
structure that helps the member through the PCS transition. ADCON produces the 
paperwork, known as “orders,” that sets the parameters of a service member’s PCS, 
detailing where, with which military unit and for how long a member will be 
stationed at the new location. These orders also authorize a member to work with 
military travel offices for the travel of self and family. Those orders also act as the 
authorization for a member to have their belongings packed up and shipped to the 
new duty station. Orders are, in effect, the currency of the transfer of duty station. 
And while they mention the new parent service military unit, they do not detail the 
nature of the work a member will be doing at the new location. The gaining unit, the 
parent service unit at the member’s new location, has the obligation to indoctrinate 





If a member is moving to a joint assignment, then a wider set of norms comes 
into play, those that enable the services to relate to one another through rank 
structures and occupational similarities. All military members from boot camp on 
have received basic information about the uniform and rank insignia of the other 
services. So they are equipped with enough information to avoid lapses in 
fundamental military protocols like knowing when and whom to salute. But 
functioning at a high level in a mixed service, or agency, or nationality environment 
is a different matter. The archive of DoD doctrine and best practices provide broad 
recommendations for how a joint organization could or should function. But to 
discover if those best practices are enabled in the flow of actual military experiences, 
the manner in which service members are recruited and prepared for joint 
assignments, and service members’ perceptions of that process, is of research interest.  
 These pre-joint assignment experiences are key to understanding joint 
experiences writ large because the day to day interactions with members from other 
services, agencies or nationalities are the opportunities for implementation of best 
practices. The joint context requires each service member to individually adapt their 
service-specific cultural models based on experience and training to understand, 
collaborate, and inform the joint context for the achievement of stated and 
(presumably) shared military goals. This transition period is an opportunity to realize 
the DoD vision of top-to-bottom jointness with training and orientations. 
Effects 
The next stage in the core logic framework is Effects. Effects are the 





working with personnel from other services, agencies or nationalities. My time in and 
with the military has shown me that members initially behave based on service-
institutionally situated and shared cultural models of military life that are the result of 
service-specific indoctrinations and experiences of day-to-day life in the military. The 
military services are very specific in their indoctrination and military training goals; 
to produce the best service members in their respective services who can accomplish 
whatever war-fighting or support jobs the military needs them to do in their 
occupational specialties. The singular focus on the rituals, traditions, rules and 
regulations of each military service effectively creates separate institutional culture-
cognitive models that prepare, enable, and even give a situated agency based on their 
rank and position to each service member while in the military. The Effects portion of 
the core logic focuses on how military members’ experiences with other services, 
agencies or nationalities challenge those service-specific institutional cultural models 
the results of which might be that the members behave differently in the joint context 
due to a possible “culture shock” that results from their lack of preparation for the 
new social context.  
Impacts 
 The core logic then frames the analysis of the consequences of how what 
happened during the joint assignment affected members’ understanding of the 
meaning of jointness and the value of continued participation in joint contexts. 
Through the narratives that members provided during the semi-structured interviews, 
I was able to identify a pattern regarding the value of jointness, what jointness means, 






 The final part of the core logic framework is called adaptations. By 
adaptations I mean how the parent services have adapted their views of joint service 
over that time span of each interviewees period of military service. By listening to 
military service personnel describe their first joint experience to the last, we might be 
able to have interviewees describe any changes they observed in the behavior and 
rhetoric of their parent service with regard to joint service. Adaptations also looks to 
characterize how the individual changed over the course of their military careers with 
regard to their views of the value of joint service.   
Interview process and Profiles of interviewees.  
The sample contributing to this study consists of those individuals who have 
served or are currently serving on active duty and have served or are currently serving 
in a joint assignment. This population includes members of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marines. All participants were 18 years of age or older and there was no 
exclusion based on gender, religion, ethnicity, or socio-economic status. Ten 
individuals participated.  
Using a snowball sampling technique, my professional associates put me in 
contact with other current or prior military members who may have been willing to 
participate and met selection criteria of having served in a joint (multi-service, multi-
agency, or multi-national assignment). I would then contact the candidate interviewee 
and introduce my project. I fully expected some candidates to politely refuse, but all 
agreed to be actual participants. We would then coordinate a time and place for the 





and I worked in an environment where digital voice recording devices are prohibited. 
Plus, while they were willing to support my research, they also had lives outside of 
the professional work setting where we met, as did I for that matter. And unlike the 
close knit community that, in my experience, forms around military service posts 
overseas, here in the US, there is an understandable divide between their 
military/private lives and their working lives. That divide is largely due to logistics 
that are a combination of family obligations and for active duty personnel, other 
military duty obligations. Eventually, 10 candidates were interviewed at times and 
places we agreed upon and the interviews were recorded.  
All personnel were given the same semi-structured interview questions (see 
Appendix C for the complete list of semi-structured interview questions). But as a 
lead-in to the questionnaire and after describing my project in more detail and 
explaining the institutional review board (IRB) process, I asked each participant for 
some background information: gender, age in years, branch of service, years in 
service (active and reserve), and years serving in joint assignments. Their service 
breakdowns and number of participants were as follows: Army 4, Air Force 3, Navy 
2, Marines 1. There were 4 women and 6 men. I did not ask them their personal 
ethnic identities. Regarding the mix of officers and enlisted, I felt fortunate to have 
four members of the Army all of whom were officers with prior enlisted service. 
They all went to officer’s candidate school or OCS, which is: 
 “the U.S. Army’s main training academy for prospective Army Officers. The 
school is generally open to qualified enlisted, along with civilians who hold at least a 
four-year college degree. Candidates who successfully complete the rigorous, 12-
week school receive formal commissions as U.S. Army Officers and assume the 






These Army personnel could speak with authority about serving joint environments 
as both enlisted and officers.  
Below is a table (Table 4.1) that captures background information about each 
interviewee. The table relates the parent service of each interviewee to their 
occupations, years of service, years in joint assignments, percent of career in joint 
assignments, whether they were enlisted or officer and the number of years of service 
at time of first joint assignment. Of note is that on average across all services 
interviewed, interviewees had approximately 20 years of parent military service and 
approximately 13 years in joint service assignments or approximately 65% of their 
careers were in joint contexts.  
Another notable detail about interviewees’ joint duty is the point at which they 
experienced their first joint assignment. Eight of the ten people interviewed 
experienced their first joint assignment within their first 3 years of service. Another 
way to think about this is that for interviewees who were or remained enlisted, their 
first joint assignment occurred in their first term of enlistment. In other words, they 
went to a joint assignment after having just been indoctrinated into their parent 
service. 
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Summary 
 The ethnographic research in this dissertation looks at the difference between 
service members’ expectations based on the stated goals of jointness, to the extent 
they have a clear idea, and what military service members experienced in their multi-
service and multi-agency assignments. My research methods fall into three broad 
categories, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and the interpretation 





complete participation that identified the research question as well as allowed a 
targeted examination of reference materials in the publicly available DoD library.  
 I introduced the core logic framework that I used to guide the development of 
the semi-structured interview protocol as well as the analysis of interviews. The core 
logic framework is structured around the concept that a military member’s service 
career is a continuum of PCS assignment experiences. Because of the importance of 
jointness and joint service to the DoD, the core logic framework acts a roadmap for 
following the causes, effects, impacts and adaptations of joint service as a way of 
understanding the manner in which jointness is treated in the flow of military service.  
Semi-structured interviews were a vital part of the research to provide 
empirical data from military members who experienced joint assignments and their 
accounts form the basis for the first cultural model of jointness. In chapter five, those 
interviews are summarized using the core logic framework. In chapter six, the 
recurring and shared themes from the experiences of service members are re-grouped 






Chapter 5: Analysis of Interviews 
Introduction 
 The results of the semi-structured interviews will be discussed in two parts. 
First I will summarize the interviews following the core logic framework here in 
chapter 5. That summary will look for patterns and include extended verbatim 
quotations from the interviewees (note: quotations include in situ parenthetical 
explanations for clarity). That summary will also be grouped according to the flow of 
the semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix C). Second, it is in chapter 6 
that the themes will be regrouped into common categories to develop two joint 
cultural schemas and to describe joint culture. I chose this approach because some of 
the themes transcended the flow of the semi-structured interview protocol and 
appeared in multiple locations throughout the flow of a person’s joint assignment.  
Causes 
 The first stage of the core logic framework is “Causes” or those experiences 
that military service members have prior to and immediately following a PCS move. 
Here we are looking at those experiences specifically surrounding a PCS move to a 
joint assignment. Having “PCSed” many times myself (I PCSed 7 times in 12 years 
while on active duty military service), I was very familiar with the process of PCSing. 
The purpose in concentrating on this seemingly insignificant period of time is to 
understand if any of those interviewed received any training or orientations prior to 
moving to a joint assignment. Causes tries to understand if military services are 
preparing personnel for joint assignments and if so, how. What this dissertation found 





PCSing to a joint assignment. There were no training sessions or orientations 
provided to personnel prior to a joint assignment. The pattern reflects broad 
agreement across ranks and services with some differences in what they knew about 
the assignment beforehand. First I will look at the commonalities and then at the 
differences. 
Pre-PCS  
Common Experiences  
 First, none of the six enlisted, or prior-enlisted, personnel knew that when 
they PCSed to their first joint assignment that it was, in fact, joint. Further, only one 
of those interviewed (officers and enlisted) had much if any say in the choice of 
assignment. This latter point is not unusual in the military in that many members have 
no control over their assignments intra-service. I raise it here to emphasize the point 
that since it is routine for the military to assign personnel intra-service with little 
choice, in the experience of those interviewed, there was no change in procedure 
when personnel were assigned to duty stations that end up being inter-service or joint.  
Also, that first joint assignment happened very early in their careers. As I 
mentioned in the interviewee profile section and cataloged in Table 4.1 (above), 8 of 
the 10 people interviewed PCSed to their first joint assignment within 3 years of 
joining their parent service. That is much too early for any of them to have received 
any formal joint professional military education (JPME) as they would have been too 
junior in rank to qualify for it. However, none of those interviewed received any pre-
PCS joint training or orientations prior to that first joint assignment. Some of those 





assignment, most had to rely on the rudimentary military service awareness training 
provided in boot camp.  
Of course all of this changed once personnel had served that first joint 
assignment and got into the routine of military life and career advancement. It was 
after that first assignment that all members became more knowledgeable about how 
the military assignments process worked within their parent service and for officers, 
they became aware of opportunities for JPME. I will discuss below the value of 
JPME in preparing officers for joint assignments based on the experiences of those 
interviewed. However, when discussing her time as an enlisted professional military 
education (EPME) instructor, the senior enlisted Air Force member mentioned that 
prior to selection for NCO status, junior enlisted personnel received no introductory 
or primary joint training or education which would be near the end of their first 
enlistment and after when they were most like to have had a joint assignment already. 
One Naval officer described their pre-PCS experience like this: 
“My first tour was really luck. And I will tell you that I think that was 
the senior Navy leadership trying to place me in a job that would, 1. Help my 
career, and 2. Would enable me to learn a little. In all honesty, the Navy 
doesn’t really talk to officers about joint, until you’re an O-4 (Lieutenant 
Commander). Now, there’s lots of opportunities where you can work with 
other services. And they might say, hey, you’re going to be able to work with 
other services and that’s great. But they don’t emphasize it because it doesn’t 
count. So, right now, the way the Navy career path works is, you are expected 
to spend your time steeped on the Navy side so that by the time you move to 
being a staff officer, a staff grade officer at O-4, that’s when you go do your 
joint tour. Because then you can best represent and compete with the other 
services on whatever the joint venture is. You know enough about the Navy to 
move forward. So, when I was coming to the assignments prior to O-4, they 
weren’t emphasizing joint. They said, hey, where do you want to go. And they 
said, if that’s where you want to go, ok. 
When going to that first joint assignment after making O-4, it was you 
can hit two milestones at once. You’re going to hit your first major 





ensigns and O-2s lieutenant junior grades), department head (typically O-3s 
lieutenants and O-4s lieutenant commanders), those are pre-reqs, but you 
actually have to go through a selection board to be an XO (executive officer – 
executes the policies of the commanding officer4 typically O-5s commanders). 
So you’re going to get your first selection tour, so that was good. And you are 
going to be working with joint entities on the base. But the Navy still won’t 
count that as a complete joint tour because you’re not signing the evaluations 
of joint people. I was in a Navy unit working with other military units. So, 
from my perspective, I did lots of joint work, but I did not receive any joint 
credit for it. And smart people ask the questions sooner rather than later. 
Which is, ok, I know that if I get a joint tour prior to O-4, it won’t count ask 
my JPME, joint phase something equivalent. It won’t count as my phase 1 
unless I’m already an O-4.  
I mean, they’ll touch very lightly on joint subjects in many of the 
courses that you go to. But you’re not going to get intensive joint training 
unless it’s specific to getting a joint qualification. And that’s driven by, are 
you going to a JDAL (joint duty assignment list) coded billet? And you can 
only fill those if you are O-4 and senior. The Navy won’t waste any of those 
on an O-3 and below because it won’t count toward your JPME phase 1 and 2. 
You gotta do the job and you gotta get the school and this counts as your two 
phases. So interestingly enough, I had a bunch of joint experiences, but I 
didn’t necessarily receive credit.” 
 
One Army officer described the pre-PCS experience like this:  
 
“Needs of the Army. No wish list. I came back from my previous 
assignment and was already to go to [his next army assignment]. Our unit was 
geared up and ready to go and they said, you’re not going.”  
 
He ended up going to the joint assignment instead of staying with his 
unit. 
 The Senior Enlisted Marine described the pre-PCS experience like this: 
 
“I was guaranteed East Coast (of the U.S.) in my contract to join the Marine 
Corps. And then it was explained to me that it can only be Camp Lejeune because of 
my career field there was no duty stations other than Camp Lejeune for my tour. So I 
might as well have chosen that. And then basically I was just offered the joint 
assignment (at the time he did not know it was joint). I wasn’t even sure where the 
assignment was. So I remember waiving my East Coast option and then they gave me 
my orders to the joint assignment…when I got my orders I was leaving quite quickly, 
near Christmas time. So I left literally days after receiving the orders. The orders were 
to report to the commander in a location in a foreign country that was some distance 
from the actual duty location. My orders took me only as far as the city where the 





Corps liaison office. Which I could not find. I had to call the travel number on the 
back of the orders and sleep in the airport until the time cycled back around to the 
East Coast so I could speak with someone. I had to book my own train ticket and find 
my way to the location of the joint assignment on my own. I was very nervous the 
entire time. I almost got robbed like twice in the airport. I was asking way too many 
questions. I was looking way too lost. So I just ended up at the joint assignment based 
on, I presume, just a detailing quota for Marines over there. Nothing influenced that 
other than the pure assignment system.” 
 
Different Experiences 
  Only one of the people interviewed had complete control over their first joint 
assignment and some of the others did engage in a dialog with their parent service 
about the joint assignment. Still, only one of them knew it would be a joint 
assignment. Also, it should be noted that the opportunity to speak with someone in 
the parent service about PCSs is quite common across the military. Some members 
even get to fill out a list of desired locations to which they might like to be assigned. 
This list is commonly referred to as a “dream sheet.” The dream sheet is called that 
because the needs of the parent service still prevail and enough people have 
experienced disappointment in their dream sheet not influencing the service’s 
decision where the member would PCS. So, while the dream sheet is by no means 
binding on the service, a dialog between the member and the service at least allows 
the service member’s desires to be heard and cataloged. Again, for this project, only 
one of the people interviewed got to choose their joint assignment where they would 
PCS.  
One Air Force officer described the pre-PCS experience like this: 
 
“My supervisor at the time. A retired chief (Chief Master Sergeant), 
when I was at my previous assignment. I said, hey I’m looking to go to a place 
close to home where most of my family is. I was married and had one kid at 
the time. But it was closer to New Jersey and it was kind of the closest base in 





lot of positions out there to have. And he said, well you can be a big fish in a 
small pond, but if you go there you be a little fish in a big pond. So he kind of 
gave me career advice. If you go there, there’s a good chance you could get 
over looked or whatever. He thought I should have gone to somewhere within 
the Air Force chain to stay within the Air Force and get known. But I said no I 
volunteered to go to the joint assignment. There was no problem getting the 
assignment.”  
 
In summary, the first stage of the core logic framework, causes, revealed what 
military personnel experienced prior to that first joint assignment. We learned that 
only one had a choice and none knew the assignment was to be joint. For that first 
joint or inter-service assignment, a pattern emerged for pre-PCS experiences based on 
those similar experiences shared across service lines, especially for enlisted 
personnel, that mirrored the normal intra-service PCS experience. With one 
exception, members had little-to-no choice in PCS destination and members had no 
advance warning that the new assignment will be inter-service/joint. With the 
emphasis placed on jointness by the DoD and the desire for “creating jointness deeper 
and sooner in the force” (DoD 2013:3), it is interesting that there would be no training 
for personnel prior to that first joint assignment.   
Effects 
 Effects are the experiences military members have, after arrival at a joint 
assignment, while serving in assignments where they are working with personnel 
from other services, agencies or nationalities. The Effects portion of the core logic 
focuses on how military members’ experiences with other services, agencies or 
nationalities challenge their parent service-specific institutional systems of meaning 





Orientations or training post-PCS 
After arrival at their joint assignments, some enlisted personnel received off-
duty seminars developed on the initiative of fellow service members to help with 
inter-service operations and relationships.  
The senior enlisted Air Force member interviewed described it as follows: 
“It was not part of the technical training (at the training assignment). If 
the orientation sessions were more institutionalized and more formulated, I 
think that would help. I think there is a need to understand the differences. 
This also goes for civilians and contractors. The biggest thing with those types 
of orientation sessions is that it can’t be the military giving an orientation on 
the civilians, only. It needs to be both. It doesn’t really help if the Air Force 
has this great idea to teach their airmen about the other services if the other 
services aren’t doing the same. Because I think it’s one of those things that 
you kind of have to be at the same level before you can begin to really 
appreciate it.” 
  
The senior enlisted Marine (retired) interviewed described it as follows: 
“When I went to a joint assignment on an Air Force base, I knew I 
would have to apply for Air Force housing. And all that was an address. 
Luckily the Air Force knew more about the Marine Corps than I had any clue 
about anything for the Air Force. I had no idea, zero. But at that assignment I 
became quite good friends with the Army unit. Once again, through the Air 
Force, the top three (enlisted ranks), recognized the other services. I met some 
senior enlisted from the Army who through a conversation, we had a top-three 
meeting, they were going to burn off some ammunition, because they had to 
reduce the ammunition inventories. So I asked if I could bring a bunch of 
Marines to fire some weapons. So I brought some Marines and I said, look 
we’ll clean all the weapons, as a senior enlisted I think it’s great for the 
Marines to keep fresh. And they gave us, no kidding, half a day to shoot off 
thousands and thousands of rounds that were expiring. It all starts with an Air 
Force person trying to bring me into a community. Every instance of 
cooperation is someone for some reason bringing others in. Not through 
training, not through publications, personally coming in and approaching you 
and bringing you in in the absence of training.” 
 
Where available, these seminars were felt to be useful. All enlisted members 
wished they had received some kind of orientation or training prior to arriving at their 





“That discussion never happened (about the assignment being joint). 
However, because my technical school was joint, they did somewhat have that 
discussion with us. It just wasn’t in the context of when you were “permanent 
party” meaning when you are done with technical school. It was more so, hey 
you go to school with all of these different services, so we, as part of our 
training progression, where you were allowed to have more and more liberty, 
you know, as your time went through training, part of that encompassed 
learning the other services ranks, how to address them how to speak to them 
and everything else. So, the jointness piece, from a military perspective was 
already kind of there and part of the training. But specifically for the joint 
assignment, that was never addressed.” 
 
All enlisted had no pre-conceptions about joint duty prior to arriving at their 
joint assignment largely because they were unaware that their assignment was going 
to be joint. 
On-duty Service Differences  
Returning to the core logic framework, perhaps the most consequential Effect 
of the joint experience is expressed in the differences people notice between their 
parent service and other services. Perhaps as a positive consequence of having no pre-
PCS jointness training, all enlisted personnel interviewed had no explicit pre-
conceptions about joint duty prior to arriving at their joint assignment. Again, they 
were unaware that their assignment was going to be joint. So the enlisted members 
approached their first joint assignment with a naïveté toward jointness. Their 
reactions to service differences, while based on a fairly brief exposure to their parent 
service, was useful to understand the impact of those differences on mission 
performance. The senior enlisted Air Force member described some of the differences 
as follows: 
“To give an example where the Air Force, you know, it’s perfectly 
appropriate to call either a staff sergeant, a technical sergeant, a master 
sergeant, or senior master sergeant, we can call them all “sergeant.” But 





that, ok, we understand that you were told in basic training that this is ok to do 
for us (the Air Force), but it is not ok for you to do that in a joint environment. 
With that there also came, you know, just the differences, I think between how 
Air Force spoke to their superiors. Because, your superiors are, yes there is 
still that military structure. Right, where you understand somebody out-ranks 
you, somebody is bigger and better than you are just by sake of their rank or 
their experience. But very early on for us, or at least me for my Air Force 
perspective, is that your supervisors were supposed to be mentors. So yes, you 
may have messed up and they would quickly correct you. But the point was 
for you to learn a lesson. And I think that the other services had that same 
approach, but I don’t think that they used it as soon as they did for the Air 
Force. So, where you saw a lot of soldiers getting, “you are going to do push-
ups” or those types of things (as a disciplinary measure). The Air Force had 
already kind of started to weed that out of us in technical school. Whereas for 
the other services I noticed it kind of lasting a lot longer.” 
 
Yet, even though none of the enlisted knew or felt prepared for a joint 
assignment, all service members, including officers, felt that because of their personal 
professional skills acquired in their parent service, they were able to navigate the bare 
basic differences in service, agency and national cultures in spite of what they 
referred to as “culture shock.” One Army officer described what he meant by “culture 
shock” at his first joint assignment, back when he was still enlisted, as follows: 
“I remember one soldier I was working with, he was very surprised, 
because he was like, I joined for the Army (meaning to be in the Army) and 
where are all the Army people. Because we were actually stationed on an Air 
Force base. It was a complete culture shock. Yes, I was aware of the other 
services, however I didn’t understand how much we would interact with each 
other. There wasn’t someone to guide and tell us all these different things. It’s 
just, you show up to work and, wait a minute, there’s all these other services.”  
 
The senior enlisted Marine described his culture shock experience at his first 
joint assignments, a training assignment, like this: 
“Going to that assignment was a bit of a shock to me actually. Because 
I had been very Marine Corps-centric. Boot camp was very Marine. My 
friends were everyone’s green. I don’t care where you come from. I don’t care 
what you do. It’s all what are you going to do. How hard are you going to 
work? If you try you won’t fail. Ultimately, as long you are working you 





never fail. Some of the stuff, the hikes, the ten mile things, just killers. They 
ran you to failure. So when you failed it was a victory because you were in it 
to fail. And that’s what they wanted you to do to test yourself because if 
you’re not afraid of failing. So the Marine Corps instilled that in me and the 
comradery component, I absolutely loved. The teams, small units, the constant 
changing of leadership.  
So the joint assignment was the first time that I was professionally 
introduced to other services. It was pretty much Navy and Marine Corps. So 
we got introduced to sailors. The Marines and Sailors were intermixed in the 
course. For some portions of it and not others. It was clear that there were 
cultural differences between Navy and Marine Corps right out of the box. The 
way you worked. They always marched together. It was strongly reinforced. 
Marines always travelled in twos. You never were alone. You marched 
everywhere you went. You were always in step with each other. And you 
were living the ideal of a highly professionalized military in an environment 
that was going to challenge that. And they (the Marines) told us that. They 
said, you will be challenged professionally, but to maintain a professional 
persona all the time. Do not compromise what you know to be right to what 
you find to be easy. They would say, you are going to have times when you 
are not observed, there’s other relationships that can occur here. These are the 
rules. This is what I (a Marine senior enlisted leader) expect of you and don’t 
compromise yourself. You have a lot of responsibility. Do it well. There was 
no question that if you did something wrong then you were going to be 
punished. It was very open.  
The introduction was that you would be challenged. You will follow 
the rules. You couldn’t wear a white tee shirt (in public) was one of those 
rules (the Navy had for off-duty attire on the base). So one of the (Marine) 
guys left his white tee on (after exercising) and we went for chow. The sailor 
wouldn’t let him in the chow hall. The sailor that was policing the appearance 
of the students, wouldn’t let him in because he had an unmarked shirt. So he 
(his Marine friend) grabbed a marker and he wrote USMC (United States 
Marine Corps) Navy stinks on his tee shirt. And he said, now it’s marked. And 
through pure intimidation, the sailor kind of backed down. It didn’t matter if 
the sailor was right at the time. The Marine had to demonstrate that he was 
going to be smarter than the sailor was.  
In hindsight, there was no attempt to learn. It was gatekeeping. To 
learn about the other services. There was no attempt to learn, appreciate, 
understand. It was contempt.” 
 
The “culture shock” that came with an inter-service or joint assignment, came 
in different forms. One commonly mentioned form was in the observance of rank. 
Sometimes rank status observance in accordance with service-specific protocol 





while his service and occupational specialty was informal with regard to terms of 
address, that officer found another service very formal to the point of being 
aggressive with regard to proper rank-based terms of address.  The officer in question 
viewed the entire episode humorously since the rank difference was only one 
increment (pay grades O-3 to O-4). That rigid formality continued until the officers 
attained the same pay grade and then terms of address became informal again. That 
Navy officer described it as follows: 
“There were cultural things. I will also have to say this. I was an 
aviator. Which is a different sub-culture even, I’m brown shoe (a uniform 
option for aviators alone), amongst black-shoe Navy. There is discipline, but 
there is maybe a looseness about it. If you’re the skipper, you are ‘sir’ and 
even if you are the department head you are ‘sir.’ Beyond that, if you’re a 
senior officer but you had no position, I owe you respect, but I may not listen 
to you. Because I will listen to my chain of command. We’ll have dentists 
show up. Flight surgeon. You know, they’ll be senior.  
A distinction in the Navy is I was an unrestricted line officer. This 
means I am unrestricted from command. I can take command of anything. 
There are other officers that are restricted line and staff. Restricted lines are 
intelligence, cryptology, judge advocate general (JAG), dental corps, etc. So 
there’s always the drill. Three of you show up in a life raft. An unrestricted 
ensign (O-1, the lowest officer rank in the Navy), a JAG admiral, an 
intelligence officer admiral, who’s in charge? The ensign. Because he is 
unrestricted line. He takes command. So, on our aircraft we had cryptology 
guys. They could not take command of the aircraft even though he is a [rank 
of] commander (officer grade O-5). The lieutenant is in charge. And there has 
been a couple of times I had to be very diplomatic with the commander who’s 
a cryptology officer what he’s trying to tell us to do as part of the mission. 
And we’re saying, uh, sir, yes sir, but all due respect we’re running this 
mission. 
“[While at his first joint assignment] one issue popped up. And that’s 
because I bumped into an Army guy. You see in the Navy, the distinction 
between, we don’t even have this term, ‘company grade and field grade’ 
(company grade is a term for O-1 through O-3 while field grade is a term for 
O-4 through O-6, major through colonel in the Army, Air Force and Marines 
only). So there was this major. Again, I look at the structure of the 
organization. So, O-5’s are branch chiefs that’s a leadership rank. O-4’s, O-
3’s and anything below if they might be there, were action officers. An O-3 





to somebody’s got to be in charge, the O-4’s in charge. Roger that. If there’s 
no one around, you’re just another guy like me.  
Well this major wanted me to call him ‘sir’ all the time. I’m not going 
to do that. Dude, we are action officers. He got angry enough that he went to 
the senior Army officer. A very senior lieutenant colonel, who called me 
aside, said, you’re Navy and you’re new with this, but here in this world. It’s 
the quote of quotes, I love this quote, in this world, it is not appropriate for a 
company grade officer to refer to a field grade officer as ‘dude, pal, or bud’. 
There were two Army officers that kept taking exception. One was the guy I 
worked with and the other was the admiral’s EA (executive assistant). The 
admiral’s EA, who at that time I equated EA to secretary. I keep, ‘dude, I need 
to see the admiral.’ He hated it that railroad tracks (the rank insignia for this 
Navy officer’s current rank of lieutenant was two parallel metal bars that is 
commonly referred to as ‘railroad tracks’) was talking to oak leaves (the rank 
insignia for all services, including Army majors, at the grade of O-4 is a 
bronze oak leaf) as ‘dude.’ And so I got pulled aside and got my own little 
lecture on it. What was funny was that when I did promote to lieutenant 
commander (the Navy equivalent to the Army major), hey, we’re buddies 
now. Now it is appropriate to use ‘dude.’ It was one of those, go away. If this 
is what matters to you, screw you.  
Now that might be an aviator thing. Because in aviation, you are either 
a good stick (a good pilot) or not. You either could handle the aircraft or you 
can’t. Because when you’re at altitude, you’re on your own. You either can do 
it or you can’t do it. There ain’t no calling home. There ain’t no time out. 
You’re moving at 330 miles per hour. That’s the whole thing about the brown-
shoe Navy vs. the black-shoe Navy. I can imagine that it’s the same in the 
SEALS (sea, air, land teams – the Navy’s special operations forces), or other 
communities of individualized skill sets. But I do know on a surface ship, they 
are rank conscious. Even to the point that when you go into the admiral’s 
mess (dining facility), when I was on the carrier (aircraft carrier), I has to sit at 
the kiddies’ table.” 
 
The acceptance and protocol surrounding relationships between officers and 
enlisted varied widely among the experiences of those members interviewed. From 
first-name basis in the work center to formal admonishments to not even associate, 
however accidentally and even off-duty, across the enlisted-officer divide. Those rank 
protocol differences were not just experienced across American military service lines. 
They were also present, but in a very different way across nationality lines. These 





stations. One Army officer described his experiences in one of his joint assignments 
this way: 
“The culture between the services. The culture between working with 
the host nation nationals. So not only was I working with different services. I 
was also working across nationalities. The host nation and the US, the Army, 
Marines, and Navy. So all that had to be learned very quickly. How to 
facilitate. How to maneuver through all that but yet do the mission. You were 
expected to figure it out. The whole term ‘iron majors’ (generally means 
maximum professionalism and self-sufficiency in all situations and presenting 
oneself to be the model of an Army officer at all times).  
I tell you it’s about people. That’s something you learn very quickly. 
It’s about communication and people. Being flexible. Trying to figure out 
what was important to them because it might not be the same to you. A prime 
example was, talk about the host country, we as Americans, we’re, as a staff 
officer, we’re taught to do analysis and here’s x, y and z and so on what we 
know to be true. Here’s your courses of action. Whereas, the host nation was 
different in that, ok boss, we know this is what you want so here you go. They 
worked to give the boss what he wanted vs. what’s the best course of action. 
And then you might tell the boss is well what you want to do is not the best. 
So, that was interesting because the two counterpart generals on the US and 
host nation side had to come together to decide what’s the best thing to do and 
how to operate and yet when I’m working with my host nation counterpart 
he’s trying to say, this is what my boss wants to do. I’m saying, I’m not going 
to tell my boss that because that isn’t the best thing to do. It was interesting 
learning how to develop that trust. How to develop that communication and 
really the art of persuasion. Convincing a culture where the subordinates 
didn’t say no, trying to teach them how to present things to their boss in such 
a way that it’s the boss’s idea. But at the same time I’ve got to keep in mind 
that I’m an American and this is what’s best for us. So how do I convince this 
other guy to convince his boss that it’s the best thing to do?” 
 
Differences related to gender 
The sample of interviewees included four women to explore any gender-
related differences within or between the services. There were issues of gender bias 
identified by the women interviewed. One enlisted female mentioned the general 
tendency for male military members to protect female members by shielding them 





perceptions of the vulnerability of female members did not rise to the level of sexual 
harassment in the opinions of the female members interviewed. The senior enlisted 
Air Force member described it like this: 
“Not that women should be given privileges, but oh, [the male 
supervisors would say] we can’t tell them to go to this detail, because, you 
know they’re a woman. Or, you know, we can’t ask them to, you know, it’s 
not right to ask somebody to whatever it may be. Stay late or do some kind of 
manual labor, because, you know, we’ve got some young healthy guys here 
who can do it. I think it is still gender bias. I don’t believe anything crossed 
the line. I don’t believe that anybody did harassment or anything like that. I 
think that there is still, yeah, that’s obvious that there’s still bias there.” 
 
The male Navy aviator described gender differences like this: 
“The difference was, were you in a warfare specialty or not from the 
perspective of the men. At this time, women were not in combat roles yet. So, 
if you were from combat arms, women were, alright, you have your special 
place. You must work, here, this is for you. The men that came from the more 
staff, intel, non-combat, were more comfortable working with women. I also 
noticed that certain services, the regimentation was between officers, but with 
the enlisted, first name basis. And, in fact I saw the opposite. Amongst the 
Navy, I would never refer to an enlisted person by their first name. Petty 
Officer, Seaman, whatever. Never their first name. Amongst officers, if we 
were of like rank, meaning we were all action officers, first name. If you were 
senior, you are ‘sir.’ Sir or Commander or Captain. But there were plenty of 
times where, like the Air Force, they refer to enlisted by first name. Like, hey, 
go see Peggy. Who the hell is Peggy? You don’t know who Peggy is? She’s in 
the Navy with you. What Peggy? Petty Officer, oh, I never knew her name 
was Peggy. Not that I’m ever going to use it, because for us in the Navy, 
that’s fraternization. (In the Navy that was considered) unduly familiar. Air 
Force did it all the time (not because they fraternized, but because that is the 
protocol/social convention when in informal settings).”  
  
The retired female Air Force officer described the differenced on the way the 
services treated women as follows: 
“I would say, when I was on the Joint Staff I noticed that male Navy 
officers were a lot more dismissive of female officers. That was my 
interaction. And it was significant enough for me to take notice of it. And I’m 
not particularly sensitive to that kind of thing because I can pretty much hold 





I did not notice in the Army nor did I notice it in the Air Force nor in my 
interactions with Marines.”  
 
That same female Air Force officer also mentioned how unusual it was for an 
international military conference, which except for her was entirely comprised of 
men, to have a female representative from the any country (she was the US 
representative at the time). She, however, was not intimidated or impeded in her 
objectives as US representative at the conference. She described it this way: 
“Before I took that job, I got a chance to talk with the guy previously 
that was doing it. I had all his notes and I stepped into his job. It was enough. 
Any questions I had, I asked and I found out. But there were definitely some, 
you could tell in these groups they weren’t used to dealing with women in the 
military of a certain rank. And I could see that. Sometimes they didn’t even 
know what to call me. And that was a little uncomfortable for them. It was 
always, you never wore uniforms to these things. Even at NATO 
headquarters. You are always in civilian clothes. And so after you go a few 
times people get to know you, because it’s some of the same groups of people 
that are attending these. They would do toasts. It’s all very formal. They 
would do toasts around the table. Sometimes they would forget that I was 
there and they would do a toast to gentlemen and then they would look at me 
and, oh, and lady. You know because they were not accustomed to having a 
woman their equal that was also representing the US. And there is a protocol 
to the seats around the table. You know you sit behind your sign. And there 
was actually a big stink when they wanted to change the nomenclature and go 
from, you know, our name was USA so we pretty much stayed the same when 
they did the change. But UK was always next to us and they were going to 
change them to GBR and they were going to go to a different place at the table 
and it caused a big stink. Other people around the table too. You couldn’t have 
the Turks next to the Greeks. And there was a lot of issues with the seating 
just around the table to even start the meetings.” 
 
That same Air Force officer observed that there were other marked differences 
between the US military services in terms of their reliance on formal regulations on 
the job. This officer’s parent service approach was to use temporary and somewhat 
dynamic standard operating procedures (SOPs) as opposed to formally coordinated 





more agile and coordinated locally than regulations that had more formal and higher 
level and lengthy coordination processes. The officer felt that the reliance on 
regulations versus SOPs may have indicated a difference in the level of detail with 
which the other military services were comfortable. That officer felt that their service 
trusted its personnel to use good judgment within the broad outlines of a less formal 
local SOP. She described it this way: 
“I had a lot of exposure to different kinds of CONOPS (concepts of 
operations) for different jobs and other kinds of preparatory documents 
whatever you might call them. It wasn’t until I got to the Joint Staff that I 
realized how much Air Force doctrine there was that I didn’t know about. And 
I do remember thinking, I wish I had known more about this whole doctrine 
thing earlier on. Yeah, I knew about certain one that were more common in 
the career field. There were a lot of other things that were more obscure that 
there was doctrine on that I did not realize. I also realized that once I got to the 
Joint Staff, that Army had way more doctrine than the Air Force did. And they 
grow up in doctrine from day one. And for the Air Force it seemed to be 
slightly different. It’s like, yeah, it’s there, but it’s not engrained and just 
beaten into you like it is in the Army.  
At the time, I believe, the Army had a doctrine center. I don’t believe 
the Air Force had an official doctrine center in the same way that the Army 
did. Now there were some doctrine experts. More pockets of it depending on 
what you worked and who was responsible for writing different kinds of 
doctrine. But I don’t know that we had the same kind of doctrine center, long 
standing doctrine center like the Army did at TRADOC (US Army Training 
and Doctrine Center).  
I think the Air Force had other types of documents to augment places 
where maybe they were short of doctrine. I think a lot of things were changing 
with the Air Force that maybe in the Army certain things had not changed as 
much depending upon what the topic was. Because in the Air Force when you 
needed to get something, you might have a basic doctrine on something, but if 
there had been a change, instead of worrying about changing the doctrine right 
away, they would come out with a CONOP, a how to, or some kind of interim 
procedure to make it happen. They wouldn’t wait to update the doctrine. That 
would come later.  
I think the Army had so much of it. There were so many Army field 
manuals on everything that you can imagine. The Air Force, as I recall, we 
just didn’t have that many. There were so many field manuals on various 
things. And we would tend to have big over-arching kinds doctrine and then 





that are changed a lot more often. You are not tied to the same level of trying 
to get them through the whole tedious process.  
I mean there’s a process if it’s joint doctrine, then it has to go through 
the joint staff and all this stuff has to be done. If it’s Air Force doctrine, it’s 
still a tedious process on the lower level, but when there needed to be a 
change, you would go ahead and update the CONOPs and other documents 
and tie them back. And the doctrine would be updated later. But by the time 
that that doctrine was updated, the concept might have changed again.  
The Army seemed to have a lot more detailed instruction about things. 
And it seemed like the Air Force, we just didn’t have nearly the level of detail 
that it seemed like some of the Army field manuals. Just a lot more topics that 
we would never do. That we wouldn’t have a field manual equivalent on it. 
We might have instructions and guidance, but it would not be presented in the 
same way. We’re big on CONOPs.  
I think it’s just differences in the way that the Army feels it needs to 
prescribe what needs to be done. I don’t think the Air Force felt that on a lot 
of the same topics, that you don’t need to be told to that level of detail. Or 
they have other ways to get you to that point in training, but they would not 
actually publish in doctrine. It might still be out there, but it wasn’t doctrine in 
the sense that it was treated that way. It’s a lot quicker to update it when you 
need to when you are not tied to a prescribed process to do it. Which you 
certainly come to appreciate when you are on the Joint Staff and having to do 
that tedious process.” 
 
This same officer had experience with doctrine at an international level 
as well. She described her experiences at the international level this way: 
“At the international level, in writing NATO doctrine, it’s a whole 
other level of ridiculousness that goes into it. I participated in five NATO 
doctrine writing trips abroad at various locations and you were working on 
particular topics and in the doctrine world, the US, UK, Canada are 
considered the standard. Most NATO doctrine is based on those documents. 
However, having said that, there are certain topics that are particularly 
sensitive in Europe and one of the things we were working on is writing a 
NATO doctrine about captured personnel and their treatment. Just coming up 
with a term that might be acceptable in all of these countries was mind-
boggling. We went through lists and lists. There were all kinds of issues. They 
would be represented by their representatives and we’d go to these meetings 
and they would have certain agendas, certain things they were trying to work. 
Interestingly enough, the conference is done in English. So, several of the 
participants from certain countries had to learn English to be able to come and 






 Even though there were surface level differences among the services, among 
officers and enlisted, similar technical occupational specialties and 
classifications/distinctions were likely to be a source of solidarity across service lines. 
One Army officer who was trained by Marines while at artillery school described the 
experience as follows: 
“The Marines, they were on board. We have a very similar culture. 
When I went to artillery school, none of my instructors were Army. I had all 
Marine officers. No Army officers. Even though it was a joint school. 
Between Marines and Army. It was all Marines. I went through that entire 
course and had no Army instructors.”  
  
  However, those inter-service solidarities based on similar occupational 
specialties could become sources of friction. Even within the same service, different 
technical specialties and classifications can be a source of friction and suspicion more 
than differences in service. Remember back to the Navy officer who contrasted the 
“brown-shoe Navy” with the “black-shoe Navy.” There are also commonly shared 
and important classifications/designations that seem to cut across service lines and are 
a source of solidarity are the combat arms vs. non-combat arms distinction and the 
company vs field grade officer distinction. Examples of specialties that seem to have 
the same effect are intelligence and artillery. An Army officer described the degree to 
which these binaries are observed and valued can exacerbate or alleviate existing 
inter-service differences in rank observance or inter- or intra-service cooperation and 
trust. He described it as follows: 
“The Marines, they were on board. Right, we have a very similar 
culture. But working with the Air Force, and somewhat, I’ll say, the Navy, 
especially the Air Force, you had to coddle them. You couldn’t just go in and 
say, move out and draw fire. You had to learn, you know, to say please. You 





were. We being the Army and Marines. So that was a big difference. There 
were several ways that got in the way. 
In particular, there was one situation, I can remember the outcome, I’m 
trying to remember the lead up to it. It was a matter of divvying out duties. I 
was a major in charge of majors. They didn’t like the delivery by which tasks 
were given. Because I came from an artillery world at the time. So once tasks 
were given, they weren’t, you know, please or maybe. It was all done in a 
respectful way though, but it was done in such a way that the artillery 
community operated. I was like, hey, I need you to do this. I wasn’t used to, 
‘well I’ll get to it when I come back.’ Or I need you to do this, and then they 
want to take off, and I’m like, whoa, where’re you going?  
When I say expectation of performance, I’m not talking about the 
quality of the work. I’m talking about the method by which they achieved 
their goals. Like I said, the Marines and Army, I think, were very lock-step in 
method and rigid on how we do things. Whereas the Air Force was kind of 
willy-nilly, you know, in how they get there as long as we get there, you 
know. The Navy guys that we worked with, they were, some of them were 
hard-chargers, depending upon what their jobs were, but they still…they kind 
of were in the middle. They didn’t cause any trouble. They were just like, 
whatever. I hate to say it that way, but they were just like whoever is in 
charge, whatever. We can roll with it. But you could tell the Air Force was on 
one side of the pendulum and the Army and Marines were on the other.”  
 
In summary, the effects portion of the core logic framework addressed those 
experiences military members have, after arrival at a joint assignment, while serving 
with personnel from other services, agencies or nationalities and focused on how 
military members’ experiences with other services, agencies or nationalities challenge 
their parent service-specific institutional systems of meaning. From the interviews 
conducted as part of this research, several patterns emerged from on-duty experiences 
in the joint environment.  One interviewee used the term “culture shock”, to describe 
the service differences they experience. Those differences were expressed in a variety 
of ways and while not everyone used the term “culture shock”, many of the 
differences were common at inter-service assignments. Perhaps the most often 
mentioned was how observances of military rank vary among the services. Among 





traditions, strict rank observances can be viewed as more important than mission 
cohesion. Many interviewees felt that the personal professional skills learned from 
their parent services were useful to avoid the grossest of errors in military protocol. 
Subtle gender differences exist in the way males relate to and task females. The 
women interviewed noticed this more than the men, but none felt that it rose to the 
level of harassment. One interviewee felt that some services seemed to need more 
formal rules than others. Formality of rules was perceived as a trust issue. Finally, 
similar occupational specialties can bridge the inter-service divide, like in artillery 
and aviation, but different occupational specialties can be a source of friction, like in 
the differences between combat arms and non-combat arms specialties.  
Impacts  
Impacts looks at the consequences of how what happened during the joint 
assignment affected members’ understanding of the meaning of jointness and the 
value of continued participation in joint contexts. While jointness is generally 
considered valuable, some interviewees offered suggestions on how to improve the 
joint experience. 
Everyone interviewed believed that joint service was valuable. Some were 
more definitive and unqualified than others, but all were effusive in their praise of 
joint assignments and the value of service with other military services. The common 
thread or theme that tied all perceptions of value together is that jointness is the way 
we fight and win wars. In that context, members felt that it is important to understand 
each other in terms of what each service brings to the table and joint assignments, in 





Iraq as an artillery officer, and who came to the intelligence field later, felt that in 
combat, hearing the “fast movers,” the Air Force and Navy strike aircraft, pass 
overhead gave him confidence and reassurance in battle. He spoke with awe about 
seeing all the instruments of American military power pointing in the same direction 
and collaborating in a shared effort. That same officer also spoke of more on-the-
ground experiences of working with other services to collaborate in sharing 
information on more immediate objectives. Those moments were impactful in 
demonstrating to that officer the value of jointness. Here is how he described with his 
take on jointness: 
“Strength through diversity. We all have one thing in common. That’s 
to defeat the enemy. We all have a different perspective on how to defeat the 
enemy. Through that diversity we are able to bring all different powers to bear 
at the same time in such a dynamic way that we can defeat our enemies. When 
you have that type of different ways to affect the enemy, the ability for them 
to respond is greatly reduced…we had all this synchronized so that we would 
all hit these targets... It was just, that’s what I mean by diversity of different 
services to bring all that to bear. That’s the power of jointness. You cannot 
achieve that without jointness. You just can’t.” 
 
That officer’s experiences in Iraq were also an example of occupational 
specialties overcoming service differences to enable mission success. Common 
occupationally-situated perspectives seemed to bolster the belief in the value of 
jointness in the aviation field as well. One officer who was a Naval Aviator, spoke 
with great confidence that all of the times he flew missions in which the Air Force or 
Army participated, it was the shared mission objectives and each participant’s clarity 
of individual mission that ensured success.  
“Army, Air Force, immaterial. As long as we all get what the objective 
is, I’ve never had a problem. Maybe because I’m aviation and I’m not so 
structured. As long as I know what you’re doing here and what I’m doing here 





what I’m wearing. Let’s go make it happen. And honestly, all we need to do is 
find out who’s got lead. You got lead, I got lead? It doesn’t matter. I don’t 
need to look at what you got on your collar.” 
“Call it the same as embracing diversity. Jointness is embracing 
diversity. The same way that embrace diversity that, like knocking out barriers 
for exclusion. Why not have a woman? Why not a person of a different race or 
orientation? Open it up. And that’s jointness. Embracing diversity. The 
answer might not be the battleship. The answer might be a single weapon on a 
single aircraft. It allows for greater approaches to how you are going to do 
stuff. It also means that you know who the right person is.” 
 
Some enlisted members felt that greater integration among the services, as 
opposed to simple co-location, would have improved operations. One Army officer 
advocating for a single military service with domain specialties for land, sea, air and 
cyberspace.  
The senior enlisted Marine who participated offered the following: 
“I would have liked, as a point of academics, to learn, as a 
requirement, to learn of the other services. My entire career in the Marine 
Corps no primary military education that required me to learn anything about 
any other service. You know it is more important that I read “The Red Badge 
of Courage” than it is that I read the history of the Air Force. Never came up. I 
got come books from the Army, training books from the Army, and I actually 
put them in the unit library. I had people give them back to me. ‘That’s an 
Army book.’ I’m like, yeah, but it’s a great book. It’s got some really great 
stuff in it. Only years later were some of those books actually introduced to 
the Marine Corps reading list. It was peculiar to me. I’m not afraid of other 
people. I’m not afraid of learning from other people. It’s become so 
institutionalized (the reluctance to learn from other services) and where’s the 
benefit? Why is jointness important to your average military person? It’s to 
get promoted. It’s not that I want to learn something from it. It’s not that 
maybe I can expand the capabilities of my parent service or I’ll incorporate 
something. It’s I need to get promoted. And why do you need it to get 
promoted? Well some Goldwater-Nichols thing decades ago, so it’s important.  
I’ve learned more about other services being retired working with 
other retired people. The people you work with who are prior service as DoD 
civilians. I’ve learned so much more. I socialize so much more. We do more 
interactions together. Most of my friends now are not Marines. A lot of them 
are retired military or have military service. I wish I had that in the military. If 
I would have had that at a young age in the military, it would have been 





more. To me, that’s what it boils down to. I mean there’s no social stigma to 
hanging around with guys in the Army.  
Thinking about it, in the service, at what point in time would you 
introduce this? What is the best time? Because you don’t want to do it too 
early. But for me once, ‘you know Air Force girls are going to get you in 
trouble.’ You get these things that are introduced to you that are not healthy 
for jointness. And there’s no training behind it. So you get these social 
stigmas. My friend and I would run with the Army. We would run with our 
classmates (at a joint training assignment) on the physical fitness tests. So we 
went to all the Army physical fitness tests and ran the courses with them. To 
help them run better because they were having trouble and they were our 
classmates. And we wanted to help our classmates. And we went and ran with 
them. Man, talk about people, you know said we shouldn’t run with them 
unless if you’re not going to beat them. I was like, I’m out there with my 
classmates. We can’t go and put a sticker on our foreheads every second. I 
want this person to pass his physical fitness test so he can complete his 
training. I don’t care if the Army guy beat me on this course. He’s probably 
just faster than I am. What’s the problem with that? ‘Don’t go out there if 
you’re not going to beat them.’ So my friend and I stopped associating with 
them. I was not going to convince them (the Marine Corps) that helping my 
classmate was more important that presenting the flag (the Marine Corps 
flag). It wasn’t going to happen. I personally thought I was better representing 
the Marine Corps. We were certainly, percentage wise, were the minority.” 
 
 In summary, while the training provided in preparation for joint service is 
somewhat less than expected and parent service endorsement of jointness somewhat 
less than enthusiastic, everyone interviewed believed joint service to be a valuable 
and necessary experience for the US military.  A recurring theme is that it is 
important for each military member to appreciate the contribution of the other 
services. So while there are many differences in the ways the services behave on the 
job, those same service differences seemed less significant in the middle of combat 
operations where clarity of mission and inter-service coordination, synchronization 
and cooperation emerged as the true value of jointness. Interestingly, these are the 
stated goals for jointness (DoD 2013b-j; 2011c) (Locker 2001). Yet they seem to 






Service members who have served in joint assignments felt that joint service 
was important and a valuable experience for all military members. However, did their 
parent services change their views of joint service over the time span of each 
interviewees period of military service? By characterizing the first joint experience to 
the last, we might be able to have interviewees describe any changes in they observed 
in the behavior and rhetoric of their parent service with regard to joint service. Below 
the account of the senior enlisted Marine interviewed is highlighted. His views are 
representative of the others interviewed. 
The senior enlisted Marine interviewed had this to say: 
“I haven’t noticed any change in the Marine Corps visa vis the other 
services…So, no. It’s not there. I mean look at the participation at the Joint 
Ball for Armed Forces Week. When it was brought up, you had to go, no one 
wanted to, you have to deal with the other services. It was not a time for 
celebration. It was a forced event. Armed Forces Week is not. The spirit of it 
is good. I’d talk to the other services. I tried to get other services go 
participate in activities of the other services. Normally the dominant service is 
willing to entertain the inclusion of another service member into their 
activities and stuff. It’s not forced. It’s not designed. If anything else, if the 
opportunity presented itself, everyone would go to their independent corners.” 
 
Regarding support for joint duty in more broadly, he added: 
 
“Several times, even Headquarters Marine Corps, ‘let’s see if we can 
get another service to be there so we don’t look like we’re doing it. It wasn’t 
that we wanted to bring in expertise. It wasn’t that we wanted to be joint. It’s 
just that we wanted to have the perception of joint vs. actually becoming joint. 
It’s that when people say ‘integrated’, it’s really separate parts sitting together. 
They’re not blended. And, you know, ‘we want to have an Air Force person 
there because it will look better.’ It wasn’t that the Air Force was going to 
bring expertise, experience or a point of view that could contribute. It was that 
we wanted to demonstrate a certain thing, not necessarily become that. 
Because, what’s the benefit? Where is the benefit of the joint duty 
assignment? It’s kind of not working well. My experience is that half the time 
they don’t actually do joint duties. And I think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 





real joint duty in NATO during the Cold War and they have some pretty good 
experiences working over in Brussels.” 
 
Regarding collaboration and information sharing, a central tenet of the 
jointness concept, he offered the following: 
“I would have to adopt processes that are resident in the other services 
that may not be supported by mine. You would have to develop joint doctrine, 
the spirit of that, but in practicality the services have their own doctrine that 
they follow that has primacy. Where is the benefit? Even now, if I was still 
active duty, to do it would make me uncomfortable because there is no benefit 
to it. You’re at more of a risk. You really are assuming a level of risk within 
your parent service. I would say that unless you know that you’re going to go 
do something that’s really cool. That somebody is actively working and it 
would be personality driven. Or leveraging somebody I trust’s opinion. But to 
holistically look at it. First thing I’d say is that I probably don’t believe it. 
That it’s really joint. That you’re not going to do joint stuff. You are going to 
do your stuff there and you’re going to be tethered to your service conditions 
and you just need to get through that joint stuff. Don’t lose focus. Don’t lose 
your track. Don’t drift. Don’t become like them. You know, you need to stay 
as pure as possible and then talk the talk and then come home.” 
 
He provided an example of how he experienced his parent service 
trying to preserve its own identity in the face of jointness: 
“Case in point, an actual example of good thinking. So Marine Corps 
went to a new uniform. So after Desert Storm, we were brown and green. You 
had desert camouflage and woodland. So the Marine Corps gave us brown tee 
shirts so that you could use them with both uniforms. Because the green ones 
weren’t a tactical match to the desert camouflage. Well we had those for like a 
month. And somebody made a little comment, ‘so you’ve got the Marine 
Corps is becoming like the Army because the Army has been wearing brown 
tee shirts for a long time.’ So, no kidding, brown tee shirt were off limits. 
Everyone go back to green tee shirts. We’re not going to be like the Army. 
And so all of us put on our desert stuff, putting back on our green tee shirts 
going why in the world am I wearing a green tee shirt with my brown fatigues, 
so I don’t look like an Army guy. There was no practicality for that. Now 
whether it was fact or fiction, to a person we were doing it because the Army 
had brown tee shirts and we weren’t going to be like the Army. Look at 
MARPAT, the Marine pattern camouflage utilities, so when it came out then 
the other services started doing it. Now there could have been a functional 
reason for it. Like the Air Force and the Navy, everyone asked why do you 





So service identity I think is necessary if you are going to have a 
separate service. But when does it go too far? When is it now not conducive to 
the concept of jointness? When are we pushing too hard about individual 
(service) identity? When you are brought up differently, so when does that get 
relaxed a little bit? When is it more beneficial to listen to others without the 
fact that I believe I’m culturally trained that I’m superior in thinking to you. 
So when does that happen? People were even talking, we’ve got the M-1 tanks 
and we didn’t want to get them because the Army had them. We had M-60s 
and they said we can’t get M-1s the Army uses M-1s. How will we know 
we’re the Marines? We’ll paint them a different color. So that always comes 
back the primacy. How do you get away from that? How do you instill 
jointness? Where do you get credit for thinking collaboratively? Yeah, you 
have to have a joint tour to be promoted, to a certain degree. That’s a box to 
check. And that’s what personally it’s become even in DoD. Joint duty is to 
check a box. I would like to go to a program where I’ll actually be working 
jointly where people would actually take the documents and work them 
together and come up with joint strategies. Not my experience.” 
 
He then concluded by asking us to imagine a cultural experiment: 
 
“A cultural experiment. If you put people together and you took off 
their uniforms and you forbade them from declaring their service and they go 
through a series of drills. Then you have them all identify each other by 
service, I’d be curious to see what that would look like and why. And you 
give them common tasks and you’d see what influences are driving them. If 
they can come up with a joint activity. It would be really interesting to see the 
results of that.” 
 
Perceptions of JPME  
Because it is such an important part of realizing the vision of jointness as 
expressed in law, I felt it was worth capturing the views of the officers interviewed 
regarding the value of jointness. While officers may have had the opportunity, 
depending on their rank, to attend JPME, attendance was only seen as a necessary box 
to check on the way to promotion, not as a way to improve joint service or understand 
the joint environment. JPME was seen more as an exercise in understanding 
regulations than in understanding the other services, agencies or nationalities. 





for that matter, they doubt it would have helped much with the inter-cultural 
dynamics experienced in a joint assignment. 
I provide a table of the joint professional military education (JPME) 
experiences for the military personnel interviewed (note: table columns are repeated 
for continuity across tables and ease of reference):  





Years of  
Service 
Years in  
Joint  
Assignments 




1 Air Force Intelligence 15 11 No Enlisted 




3 Marines Intelligence 20 16 No Enlisted 




24 12 No Officer 




7 Navy Intelligence 26 12 
Yes. JPME 













9 Air Force Intelligence 20 12 No Officer 




   
Ave ~20 
yrs 
Ave ~13 yrs   
 
The retired Navy officer who had been to JPME, described its value like this: 
 
“By the time I got to doing it formally, which was in a JDAL coded billet (her 
final assignment in the Navy), they sent me to JPME in-route, so I got the course 
beforehand. But I’d actually gone to a really great joint class before I ever went to my 





phases), which is a great course. I loved it…Just that course alone made so much 
better on the Navy side when I deployed, I got it. I’d had some experiences in my 
younger tours. This kind of brought it home. I was able to do a lot of the planning and 
had a much better picture where I could at least say, we need to go and talk to so and 
so on the ground because we don’t know enough about that. That’s an Army thing or 
that’s an Air Force thing. There was absolutely nothing that you do with those higher 
levels of planning that won’t ultimately impact other services. So, you never fight a 
war on your own. And even if all you’re doing is keeping the peace, you’re still 
keeping somebody informed so in case it went to war you would know what is going 
on.” 
 
With regard to the value of JPME specifically, she envisioned a “JPME phase 
3, not meaning the general officer Capstone course (see Appendix B), that would be 
more of an applied JPME as opposed to the more theoretical JPME that occurs in 
phases 1 and 2. She talked about it as follows: 
“I usually found that when you had to try to figure out how you apply the 
different services to move forward (on some joint activity), I had very few people 
who actually understood that well…Because in the absence of a group of people who 
understood it well or had the time to devote to moving it forward, people just created 
what they thought was a good idea and it completely negated all of this joint training 
that we had gone to the trouble of going to in phase 1 and 2. It seems to me that when 
it comes to implementing that joint training in war time, you ought to have a joint 
expert who is so well steeped in that operational planning and how you do business, 
that the very first thing you do is bring those people in at the beginning to help set up 
you staffs and get things running until it becomes a natural muscle movement. Then 
they go away. You need to have that. 
If I could design anything absolutely the way that I wanted, I would say that 
you should have a JPME phase 3 (not meaning the existing third phase of JPME 
known as the general officer Capstone course). It’s one thing to plan something and 
to get the process going. It’s another thing to execute that process and then to apply it 
to all the daily situations that you will be in once that plan starts being executed. 
Because, obviously, your JPME phase 1 and 2 teach you how to do the operational 
planning and they teach you how to feedback into this process as things change. What 
they don’t teach you how to do is, how do you monitor things? That’s part of your 
everyday job. And then feed back into this continual process. It doesn’t have to be a 
long training, but it has to be eye-opening and it has to be something that will make 
people understand why it’s important as part of your regular day job to know about 
this joint planning process. I got the impression that there was a lot of people that 
although they had been to the training, didn’t really think it applied to them even 
though they were in a joint war. And they often used the excuse that we were working 
with coalition forces…as a reason why they wouldn’t use the joint process. I said, 





also the reason why we have foreign partners attend our JPME phase 1 and 2 training. 
It’s so that when they go back to their home countries, they can continue to advocate 
on how to plug into that process. But there are many places we ignored that in 
Afghanistan.” 
 
 Joint professional military education (JPME) is not common among the 
sample that participated in this research. None of the six enlisted, or prior-enlisted, 
had JPME, which is a natural result of the service rules surrounding rank that dictate 
when enlisted personnel should receive JPME (see Appendix B). However, none of 
those enlisted personnel received any “jointness” training or orientations early in their 
careers prior to their first inter-service, or joint, assignments. Two of the officers 
interviewed had some JPME and two did not. Of the two that had some JPME, they 
felt that it needed improvements. Also one officer who had JPME 1 and 2 found 
themselves in a joint environment where the other people in the organization did not 
and did not understand joint processes. The two officers who did not have JPME 
either did not mention it or felt it was just a box to check and did not feel held back in 
doing their job by not having it. Overall, the impact of JPME on the joint experiences 
of the sample interviewed was neutral but if it provided the kind of inter-service or 
inter-organizational cultural competency training to make working in a joint 
environment less of a surprise, they probably would appreciate it more.    
Summary 
 In this chapter we got a glimpse of the important aspects of joint assignments 
from pre-PCS to service in a joint environment to reflections on how to make joint 
assignments and jointness in general even better. In the next chapter I will refocus the 





joint culture. More specifically I will discuss those themes in the context of two 
interrelated cultural schemas, a schema of and a schema for jointness. Because both 
schemas interact to create the framework of anticipatory joint cultural knowledge a 








Chapter 6: The Culture of Jointness 
 Above I summarized the results of the semi-structured interviews by 
navigating the interview process with the core logic framework that was used to 
develop the semi-structured interview protocol. That summarization allowed for a 
descriptive and almost "procedural" look at the experience of jointness from the 
perspective of those who have lived it. As we saw, many common or shared themes 
emerged from the various accounts of the lived experience of joint service. One 
approach to understanding and developing shared cognitive structures is to look for 
those commonly held ideas. To review, there are two types of cognitive structures 
that may be revealed in the analysis of interviews. First are schemas that are 
simplified structures that equip people to solve new problems in each context or in 
totally new contexts because each person can tap into their version of that knowledge 
and repurpose it to meet new demands (D’Andrade, 1992). A schema becomes a 
cultural model when it is intersubjectively shared and/or interrelated with one or more 
other schemas (D’Andrade, 1987; 1992). By reviewing the contents of interviews we 
can understand interviewees’ similar experiences and the shared ways they express 
them. Within those experiences there were common themes that emerged as joint 
cognitive structures both of which are joint cultural schemas which together 
interrelate to form a cultural model of jointness. 
 Before describing the joint cultural schemas and model, I would like to briefly 
discuss the way I use the term “models” in this dissertation. Geertz makes an 
important distinction about models, in the general sense, not drawing a fine line 





between models created to capture cultural concepts. Models designed to capture 
cultural concepts in an “objective conceptual form” (Geertz 1973: 93) he describes as 
models of cultural patterns (Geertz 1973: 93). Models of are a more of an outsider’s 
view of cultural patterns depicted in a way as to make the cultural concepts fit a 
conceptual form that will render those patterns intelligible to outsiders.  Geertz 
contrasts models of with models that adapt themselves to the relationships expressed 
in the cultural meaning (Geertz 1973: 93). The models that adapt the conceptual form 
to the cultural meaning are referred to as models for (Geertz 1973: 93). Models for 
are more of an insider’s view of cultural patterns. Why leverage this distinction? 
What possible value does it add to the development and analysis of the culture of the 
joint environment?  
While reviewing the content of the interviews gathered in this dissertation and 
reflecting on my own participant observation experience and knowledge, I realized 
that there were at least two interrelated patterns embedded in the accounts of 
jointness. Both patterns emerged as useful ways to display and describe the 
experiences of US military personnel as they navigate joint service. The first was 
related to the procedures or process of transferring to a joint assignment. Patterns 
emerged in the accounts of the process of transferring to a joint assignment and the 
challenges on-duty. The other is sort of a tacit priority of objectives based on a US 
military person’s natural focus on duty and mission. If I put myself in the shoes of 
those who serve and consider their accounts of joint service, then the joint cultural 
dynamics of a joint assignment process or procedures are to be learned and to which 





serving in joint assignments from an order of precedence or priority point of view, 
and then categorizes those ideas into a “mission centered” depiction, that becomes the 
cultural pattern of jointness. I conclude that these are both schemas vs. cultural 
models because they exist in the minds of people out of the immediate context of 
their application. While they were cultural models while in the context of their use 
and those experiences helped to create the conceptual framework that these 
interviewees carried to the next joint assignment, in the meantime, before they are 
intersubjectively shared in another joint cultural context, they remain simplified 
structures. Of course they tap into prior experiences as a way to employ and adapt 
that experience the new context, but until that in situ adaptation is taking place, and 
the basic outlines of the cultural schemas are instantiated and intersubjectively shared, 
they remain schemas. The cultural model of jointness emerges, in the case of this 
research, not only when the schemas were intersubjectively shared, but because they 
are also interrelated. Both schemas were interrelated when service members shared 
their perspectives on joint experiences. Service members are simultaneously figuring 
out and adapting to the moment-to-moment joint cultural encounters associated with 
joint service motivated by a desire to accomplish the mission.  
The joint cultural schemas become a joint cultural model when they are 
intersubjectively shared (D’Andrade, 1987), as when people from their separate 
military services begin to live and work in a joint environment or when they are 
interrelated (D’Andrade, 1992) as in the accounts of joint service provided by the 
interviewees. Together, they and their new joint organization, navigate emergent 





member brings to the assignment. A key feature of the joint environment is the 
fleeting nature of relationships. Relationships are fleeting because of the 
asynchronous, or uncoordinated movement of personnel into and out of the joint 
organization. Each organization has its own “rotation” (PCSing) schedule which 
complicates the renegotiation of the kinds of behavioral norms, like formal and 
informal joint concepts, customs and courtesies, and understanding and appreciating 
the organizational diversity mix in the joint organization. This concept of the fleeting 
nature of relationships in organizations has been usefully referred to as contingent by 
Smircich (Smircich 1983: 347).  
I assert, then, that the culture of jointness is contingent on the mix of services 
and other organizations present in the joint environment. From the interviews, I see 
two primary ways to depict the joint experience from the perspective of those who 
have lived it. One can be described as the priorities of service members and the other 
could be described as the process of joint service. Both usefully depict the joint 
cultural experience but from different modeling perspectives. 
The joint environment is thus depicted in Figures 3 below which introduces 
the cultural schema of jointness, the tacit priorities informing and motivating the 
actions of the personnel interviewed. I maintain that it is a cultural schema of 
jointness because it does not become a model, as D’Andrade advocates, until it is 
intersubjectively shared in the dynamic and contingent environment that is the joint 






Figure 6.1: A Cultural Schema of Jointness 
 
 If we step through the cultural schema of jointness, we can remember from the 
accounts of the value of jointness, that for military personnel, mission is the highest 
priority. That is why the “mission” ring of the somewhat eclectic Venn diagram 
encompasses all others. Because if one is motivated by mission as the highest 
priority, then what comes next is, by definition, less important, not unimportant, just 
less important. We saw that in the accounts of both the Naval aviator and the Army 
artillery officer. They both spoke with great pride in how all instruments of national 
power brought together in the joint environment showed the inherent “strength 
through diversity” of the joint environment to accomplish the mission. That 
camaraderie of diverse organizations, is a crucial element of the schema of jointness. 
Again, it is not as important as accomplishing the mission, but it is still vitally 
important to joint culture. This is why diversity is nested within the joint mission. We 
also saw from the interviews that because joint organizations come together to 
accomplish the mission, a dynamic adaptation occurs that allows a renegotiation of 
customs and courtesies and the application of joint policy. Again, these are important, 





accustomed because joint culture is about a compromise, a renegotiation of the rules 
of behavior. 
By contrast, if we view the schematic of joint experience in a more procedural 
or linear step-wise fashion, in terms of the cultural patterns explicitly encountered, 
then we see more of a schema for jointness in Figure 4 below. The elements of the 
schema for jointness are not depicted in priority order, but in the order encountered. 
From the parent service, pre-PCS experience to the first arrival at the joint assignment 
to juggling the inter-organizational dynamics of the make-up of the joint organization 
to ultimately making all work in terms of accomplishing the mission. The cultural 
schema for jointness is also still a schema until intersubjectively shared on-site. 
Ahead of time, or after the assignment is over, these become the challenges people 
remember and retain for the next joint experience.  
Figure 6.2: A Cultural Schema for Jointness 
 
The schema for jointness is dynamic and adaptive as well, but is more about 
the bureaucracy of joint assignments, than the mission. This is why “figuring it out” is 
the ring of the Venn diagram that encompasses all others. As we saw in the 





specific procedures for navigating the joint assignment process. As we also saw, the 
degree to which the services apply both the joint training goals of the DoD and the 
crediting of “joint” service, while strictly in compliance with the law, does not give 
service members for each and every joint assignment. So, the disconnect between 
formal and informal jointness is the first step in the process of PCSing to a joint 
assignment that must be figured out. Along with developing the understanding of 
joint assignments, as procedurally indistinguishable from normal intra-service 
assignment as they may be, upon arrival, service members are confronted by the 
inter-service differences in customs and courtesies. Armed with their intra-service 
standards of military protocol surrounding customs and courtesies, service members 
re-negotiate the rules of behavior in the joint cultural setting. It is in that encounter 
with the differing customs and courtesies that service members discover the 
organizational diversity of the joint setting. All of the organizations bring their own 
institutional structures of meaning (Batteau 2001) that must be understood on the way 
to accomplishing the mission. Again, the Venn diagram that depicts the cultural 
schema for jointness is not intended to imply that one element is more important than 
the others. These are nested concepts because they are encountered in an order that is 
a by-product of the joint assignment process.  
So, I have identified two joint cultural schemas. One lays out the clear 
priorities of service members with accomplishing the mission at the top of the list. 
The other looks more step-wise at the journey to jointness each service member takes 
in their own way and with their own capacity to solve each challenge along the way. 





without imposing my bias by arbitrarily preferring the procedural account of the steps 
in the joint assignment process over the importance of mission, or the priorities of the 
joint assignment. I needed to find a way to illustrate the joint cultural context in an 
integrated way because those interviewed seemed to be using both schemas at the 
same time when they shared their experiences with jointness. One solution is to 
combine the two perspectives. By building a matrix of the two schemas, I found that 
it captured the general joint cultural knowledge interviewees were communicating in 
their personal accounts of joint service. The matrix or general joint cultural 
knowledge table emerged as a two-dimensional cultural model of jointness by 
combining the schemas of and for joint culture. 
The idea for building a matrix of the two schemas was inspired by Spradley’s 
descriptive question matrix for participant observation (Spradley 1980:82-83) 
combined with Bernard’s discussion of displaying concepts and models as part of 
grounded theory text analysis (Bernard 2002: 462-476). Spradley developed his 
original descriptive question matrix to help ethnographers grapple with the 
complexity of social situations by focusing their attention on the interrelationships 
among key features of the social setting (Spradley 1980: 80). Spradley viewed the 
descriptive question matrix as an important antecedent to going into a social setting as 
a participant observer to guide question development. Bernard’s discussion of 
grounded theory goes beyond the process of discovering substantive categories of 
themes grounded in interviewee narratives (Bernard 2002: 470). Bernard explains that 
it is important to display concepts and models derived from interviews and that is 





used the concept of social setting interrelationships from Spradley and the 
relationship of concepts grounded in interview data from Bernard as inspiration for 
the cultural model of jointness, interrelationships that are a combination of the 
schemas of and for jointness.  
These cognitive structures, the schema of jointness and the schema for 
jointness interrelate and form a cultural model of jointness. The cultural model of 
jointness or intersection of the interrelationship of these two schemas is tacit in the 
sense that service members do not carry an explicit written checklist of the things 
they need to know to function effectively in a joint environment. However, those 
interviewed do seem to be both goal driven and motivated to figure things out as they 
go. That intersection reveals their desire to make progress toward the mission and is 
what it means to serve in a joint assignment. Cultural meaning is constructed 
incrementally, situation by situation, figuring out the unfamiliar while staying true to 
their primary objective.  
To illustrate this, I have outlined a cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 
below) that is based on the experiences of the people interviewed. The table relates 
the schema of jointness to the schema for jointness and posits the kinds of joint 
cultural knowledge a person might need at each step and priority. Some of the 
intersection points in the map were addressed explicitly by the interviewees. The 
cultural model of jointness and how interviewees addressed it is explained in Table 






Table 6.1: A Cultural Model of Jointness 
A Cultural Model of 
Jointness 
Schema of Jointness 
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5 Step 5: Mission 
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As a way of explanation, each row will be take in turn beginning with step 1, 






Figuring it out 
While US military service members are mission focused, we learned from 
interviews that joint service is first and foremost a process of figuring out what to do 
in a given joint situation. Service members begin by building upon their service-
specific cultural models that are first developed during indoctrination at boot camp 
and reinforced through regular day-to-day intra-service activities, to develop an 
emergent joint schema with useful parts retained and new structures added to 
accommodate sources of uncertainty that need to be filled in with experience and time 
in the joint environment. A major source of uncertainty is the disconnect between 
what I call formal and informal jointness. This disconnect is revealed in two ways, the 
unevenness of formal joint training prior to and after arrival at a joint assignment and 
the somewhat unenthusiastic formal embrace of jointness and joint concepts by the 
parent service. Informal jointness seems to be the most common and service members 
succeed through their own devices and professionalism regardless of the mix of 
organizations or nationalities.  
Jointness as a concept applies to more than US inter-service assignments. The 
concept extends to assignments with foreign nationals as well (10 USC 99-433 sec. 
668). When dealing with a foreign military or other foreign organization, navigating 
the differences between US organizations must seem easy by comparison. The sample 
of interviewees in this dissertation included two officers, one Army and one Air 
Force, who worked with foreign militaries on a regular basis. Both were intelligence 
officers at the time of their multi-national service. Neither officer had any language 





communications occurred in English, but both officers were left to their own devices 
to understand how to interact with the foreign representatives that they encountered 
on the job.  
Regarding preparation for multi-national service, the Air Force officer 
described it like this: 
“You are told as an Air Force officer; you are going to be asked to work in a 
lot of different situations. You are going to be put in good situations, bad situations, 
uncomfortable, into situations you know nothing about and you weren’t prepared for. 
And so it’s up to you how you respond to it. So you were told up front, you know, 
you figure this stuff out.” 
 
Something the Army officer described was the differences in candor between 
the US forces and their foreign counterparts. He described   
“…How to facilitate. How to maneuver through all that but yet do the 
mission. You were expected to figure it out. The whole term ‘iron majors’ (an Army 
term that generally means maximum professionalism and self-sufficiency in all 
situations and presenting oneself to be the model of an Army officer at all times).  
A prime example was, talk about the host country, we as Americans, we’re, as 
a staff officer, we’re taught to do analysis and here’s x, y and z and so on what we 
know to be true. Here’s your courses of action. Whereas, the host nation was different 
in that, ok boss, we know this is what you want so here you go. They worked to give 
the boss what he wanted vs. what’s the best course of action… So how do I convince 
this other guy to convince his boss that it’s the best thing to do?” 
 
Neither officer mentioned the need for additional training prior to their joint 
assignments where they worked with foreign nationals because both felt that it was 
their job to figure out the best way to get the job done. The Naval aviator describe 
how he figured it out like this: 
 “Army, Air Force, immaterial. As long as we all get what the objective is, I’ve 
never had a problem. Maybe because I’m aviation and I’m not so structured. As long 
as I know what you’re doing here and what I’m doing here and we both get it, let’s go 
do it. I don’t care what you wear and I don’t care what I’m wearing. Let’s go make it 
happen. And honestly, all we need to do is find out who’s got lead. You got lead, I 






 All of these officers’ accounts of figuring it out follow the same general 
unconscious priority system. Focus on the mission and work it out with the other 
parties involved. Jointness as an exercise in figuring it out can be viewed through the 
lens of the cultural model of jointness. We can see the intersection of row 1, figuring 
it out, and columns A through E, priorities 1 through 5. An extract from Table 6.1 is 
provided here for ease of reference: 
Extract from Table 6.1: Step 1: Figuring it out 
A Cultural Model of 
Jointness 
A B C D E 























































All officers had a clear focus and priority on accomplishing the mission and both 
learned what they needed to about the organizations with whom they worked. They 
figured out how to succeed in a given situation through the targeted application of 
protocols and practices across the organizational mix in the joint environment all the 
while making the joint environment succeed by accomplishing the mission.  
However, to get to the stage that a service member is interacting with other 
organizations in a joint environment, that service member first has to get to the joint 





using the core logic framework in the summary of interviews above, the service 
member has to understand and deal with their parent service’s uneven treatment of 
formal jointness. That unevenness comes in a variety of ways: training, like joint 
professional education (JPME) and pre-PCS orientations and selection for 
assignments and credit for previous assignments that happened to be joint, but may 
not have been treated as such or during which the service member was too junior in 
pay grade to receive credit even if it were a formally coded joint assignment. I refer to 
this set of challenges as the disconnect between formal and informal jointness.  
Formal vs. informal jointness 
 While everyone interviewed felt that joint service was beneficial and they 
would all recommend it to other members of their parent services, the concept of 
jointness as it relates to DoD requirements is viewed, at best, as a necessary evil. 
However, the benefits of working side-by-side with other services was, on balance, 
viewed as a net positive. This seemed to indicate a disconnect between the formal 
policy-driven view of jointness and the informal or lived experience with jointness. 
This disconnect was especially acute when the conversation turned to two areas, first, 
joint professional military education (JPME) and second, to receiving joint duty credit 
for joint service performed in “uncoded billets” or joint service that was performed 
before the earliest grade of eligibility for joint credit, O-4, Major or Lieutenant 
Commander. Of course, the enlisted corps in all services never receives “formal” 
credit for joint service. The enlisted members interviewed benefited in other ways, 






Regardless of whether they were officer or enlisted, everyone interviewed felt 
that both JPME (even for enlisted) and joint duty credit (for officers) were just boxes 
to check on the way to higher promotions. The real value of jointness to those 
interviewed was discovered through experience. The value of jointness is expressed 
in the realization that joint is how we fight and win wars, in how we accomplish our 
primary mission. To serve in such an environment was an opportunity to experience 
that first hand. Interestingly, even though formal policies recommending joint duty or 
JPME were not that highly regarded, interviewees thought that having some kind of 
formal training in the socio-cultural inter-organizational dynamics would have been 
useful in preparation for joint assignments. This would benefit the service member 
not just by helping them understand appropriate customs and courtesies, but to know 
enough about joint organizations and activities to adapt to a given situation.  
 The disconnect was not just on an individual level, the parent services also 
seemed to be lukewarm on the idea of formal jointness as well. None of the people 
interviewed experienced any enthusiasm on the part of their parent services with 
regard to advertising joint opportunities or talking up the virtues of joint 
environments. In fact, tacit messages seemed to one of inter-service competition more 
than voluntary or opportunistic learning or mutually beneficial cooperation.  
The disconnect between formal and informal jointness follows cultural model 
of jointness (Table 6.1 above) along row 2 and, again, along columns A through E, 
priorities 1 through 5.  
 Extract from Table 6.1: Step 2: Formal vs. Informal Jointness 
A Cultural Model of 
Jointness 
A B C D E 
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We heard from interviewees that while they were themselves focused on 
accomplishing the mission, they received conflicting messages that appeared to show 
a disconnect between formal and informal jointness. Yet, in spite of that disconnect, 
everyone interviewed felt that the organizational diversity in a joint setting is a 
positive thing and they worked with other organizations enough to get the job done, 
but would like to have seen a more formal philosophy of true integration vice simple 
colocation. How personnel reacted in a given joint situation lacked the guidance of 
formal training or education. It was through flexibility and adaptability that 
interviewees overcame the disconnect between formal and informal jointness.  
The lived experience of jointness is a story of the difference between what 
policy says and joint reality. The primary example is in the fact that everyone had 
multiple and frequent assignments of a joint nature, but very few of those assignments 
were credited by the parent service as joint in the formal sense that it checked the 





interviewed yet it is supposed to be the companion to joint assignments as laid out in 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) 1800.01E for officers and 
1805.01B for enlisted and as stated in law (10 UCS Chapter 107). In defense of the 
services, if they do not formally consider an assignment as joint or if the service 
member is too junior in rank at the time of the assignment, then JPME would not be 
needed.  
Knowing or expecting there to be a disconnect between formal and informal 
jointness is a part of the joint experience. Service members rarely receive formal 
parent service credit for assignments where they work side-by-side with members 
from other services, US agencies, or foreign countries. Service members receive very 
little practical joint training prior to of during joint assignments or as part of a larger 
career development plan. With time and experience in their parent services, military 
members acquire savvy with regard to joint environments. However, each assignment 
is a unique and because the mix of personnel is protocols for interaction are 
contingent upon which organizations are present. Learning the protocols for how to 
relate to others in the joint environment is renegotiated on each assignment. The 
element of the cultural schema for jointness that covers the learning and 
understanding protocols of behavior is called customs and courtesies.  
Customs and courtesies 
 While the military symbols and protocols that form the basis of initial 
interactions, commonly referred to as customs and courtesies, are understood to 
demand that members behave in certain ways. As we have seen above, not everything 





significance. Intra-service significance can be completely missed by other services. 
As we saw from the interviews, a lot of the inter-service differences centered on the 
most fundamental of the customs and courtesies, those associated with rank. 
 To allay any fears and to the best of my knowledge, at the level of commonly 
understood rules and regulations regarding the protocol surrounding signs of respect, 
there is no disagreement among the service branches on what to do in an inter-
service, or joint environment. What we saw above in the interview summary of on-
duty experiences were differences in the standard service-specific cultural practices 
surrounding terms of address and differences and the significance attached to some 
forms of rank-based terms of address or categorizations like those dealing with 
command eligibility or that are connected to specific occupational specialties, like 
aviation.  
For example, the senior enlisted Air Force member interviewed described her 
first exposure to the differences in terms of address in a joint environment as a 
wakeup call for when and how to use the standard Air Force term of address, 
“sergeant” in an inter-service environment, especially with the Army. In the Army, 
the term of address “sergeant” is reserved exclusively for the specific Army rank of 
sergeant (pay grade E-5). In the Air Force “sergeant” is an acceptable term of address 
for all non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the term “sergeant” in their official 
rank designation except chief master sergeants, who are referred to as “Chief.” 
 The Naval aviator interviewed shared a different experience, this time an 
intra-service difference that had to do with the command status of fellow officers. In 





comes with being an aviator, he described how officers outside his chain of command 
are given a basic due respect based on their rank, but he may not listen to them. 
 Differences in terms of address, or how one military person speaks to another 
military person, is a long-standing point of concern among the military services and is 
not a new discovery in this dissertation. I emphasize it in the cultural schema for 
jointness because it is an ever present characteristic of the culture of the joint 
environment.  
While the concept of terms of address includes when to use terms of rank, as 
in rank titles, when addressing another person, it also includes what is considered 
within the service to be a general tone and climate of respect in common everyday 
interactions.  It seems as if it is in the everyday interactions where the service cultures 
differ. More specifically, in addition to when to use rank titles, it is in the service-
specific expectations of what amounts to a tone of proper respect that seems to be at 
issue. One of the Army officers interviewed felt that in terms of the formality and 
rigidity of rank relationships, the Army had a closer affinity to the Marines, than, say, 
the Air Force who seemed less formal. He felt that orders did not need explaining or 
convincing to be carried out in the Army and Marines, whereas with the Air Force it 
was more of a negotiation that he referred to as “coddling.”  
A socially appropriate pattern of when to use rank titles and how to interact 
across service lines is not truly shared. It may be understood on a more basic and 
more theoretical level, but it is not internalized through lived experience. It becomes 
shared through a renegotiation as corrections are given and adjustments are made to 





phrase (Geertz 1973:144-145), does not begin to be shared until the member enters an 
inter-service or joint environment.  
 Because the joint organizational mix is constantly changing, relationships are 
contingent based on time on station and the mix of services and ranks. The work 
environment could be informal with regard to customs and courtesies one day and 
become more formal the next with a simple change of leadership. This dynamic 
requires personnel to adapt to the changes. They fall back on their general military 
training and renegotiate the relationships.  
 Customs and courtesies can also be followed through the cultural model of 
jointness (Table 6.1 above) along row 3 and intersecting columns A through E, 
priorities 1 through 5.  
Extract from Table 6.1: Step 3: Customs and Courtesies 
Map of joint cultural 
knowledge 
A B C D E 








































































As it does throughout the joint experience, mission focus motivates service personnel 





Service members expect to have to learn the customs and courtesies that come with 
the specific joint organizational mix because there is little to no training relevant to 
the joint context beforehand. The on-the-spot learning of context-specific customs 
and courtesies means that service members also have to learn to selectively apply that 
knowledge by adapting to each situation in the joint environment. Of course, the mix 
of customs and courtesies is contingent on the mix of organizations in the joint 
environment and protocol is applied regardless of whether or not the joint assignment 
is formal.  
 Intra-service customs and courtesies make up a large part of the indoctrination 
that military members go through when they leave civilian life and joint the military. 
As a result, customs and courtesies are almost second nature for service member 
when interacting within their own parent service. However, the joint environment 
challenges those ingrained norms of behavior. The contingent mix of organizations 
means that service members are vigilant to personnel changes and differences in both 
formal and informal interaction rules. Yet it is the mix of organizations, the diversity, 
of the joint environment that makes it attractive to those interviewed.    
Diversity 
 The attribute of the joint environment that makes it the joint environment is 
the diversity of organizations present. According to 10 USC 99-433 sec. 668: 
 “…the term "integrated military forces" refers to military forces that are 
involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations involving participants 
from-(A) more than one military department; or (B) a military department and one or 
more of the following: (i) Other departments and agencies of the United States. (ii) 
The military forces or agencies of other countries. (iii) Non-governmental persons or 
entities.” 





So a diverse mix of organizations is the definition of jointness. As we saw above, that 
diversity can cause problems with knowing the appropriate customs and courtesies 
for a given situation. However, those interviewed see diversity as one of the main 
sources of value that service members take away from a joint assignment.  
The Naval aviator interviewed described it as “embracing diversity” in that when the 
US military conducts operations, it is done as a single entity, a single military force. 
He added that to do so, one must keep an open mind to a variety of options and 
capabilities that are represented in the joint mix of organizations present in the joint 
environment. It is a mission focus that allows the consideration of one option over 
another based on what is best for the mission. That appreciation for the diversity of 
the joint environment is enhanced by face-to-face experience working side by side 
with inter-service colleagues. The female Army officer interviewed saw that face-to-
face, side-by-side joint experience as the best way to overcome pre-conceived notions 
about other services. 
What each member of the joint organization can contribute to the mission is 
both a learning opportunity and a source of strength for the joint mission. That 
diversity was expressed in terms of military services, US government agencies, 
nationalities, genders, and occupational specialties. Service members are challenged 
to understand those contributions while keeping protocol straight during interactions.   
Appreciating the value of joint service in terms of diversity, however, seems 
to have become a personal initiative because parent services did not seem to 
accentuate the organizational diversity value of joint service. The senior enlisted 





to experience and learn about the valuable contributions of the other services because, 
to him, the Marines were more concerned about accentuating the superiority of the 
Marine Corps than in learning from the other services or even having joint learning 
materials available to other Marines. However, if service members are willing to take 
the initiative, as that senior enlisted Marine did in partnering with other senior NCOs 
at one of his joint assignments, and learn from the diverse professional social 
environment created by jointness, they seem to view the experience as positive and 
worth recommending to others in their parent service. 
The cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 above) traces the element of 
diversity (line 4) through the schema of jointness, or the priorities of joint service, 
columns A through E.  
Extract from Table 6.1: Step 4: Diversity 
A cultural model of 
jointness 
A B C D E 











































































As we learned from those interviewed, the strength of diversity in a joint 
assignment is primarily seen in the contributions of each organization to the success 
of the mission. Those contributions are learned through joint experience either as a 
byproduct of the working with the other organizations or through personal initiative. 
Specific situations demand the best mix of capabilities from a diverse set of 
contributing organizations. Jointness is about learning that best mix, but it is also 
about applying the proper protocols for the right organizations. Finally, the strength 
of diversity that is jointness is discovered on-the-job and is not taught. This is ironic 
because achieving the best mix of diversity of organizational contribution is the 
foundational concept behind jointness. The DoD’s Insights and Best Practices Paper 
dealing with Joint Operations describes it this way: 
“Every headquarters we visit identifies the need for continuing efforts to 
maintain effective unity of effort with both our USG agencies and multinational 
partners as key to achieving success in this complex environment. The military can’t 
do it alone and they recognize the value of harmonizing and synchronizing military 
actions with the actions of other instruments of national and international power.” 
(DoD 2013b: 8) 
 
Accomplishing the Mission 
 Finally, there is a mission to accomplish. Throughout this analysis, as we 
review the perspectives of those who have experience joint assignments and lived and 
worked with other services, agencies or nationalities, the highest priority has been the 






Extract from Table 6.1: Step 4: Getting the mission done 
A cultural model of 
jointness 
A B C D E 
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It is so obvious and so endemic to the military experience that it becomes the 
underlying assumption, the context, for all discussions about jointness and joint 
culture. Accomplishing the mission is of course why the concept of jointness was 
originally developed. Yet, how the mission is accomplished is by leveraging the 
capabilities of a heterogeneous mix of organizations. The fact that it is necessary to 
leverage those capabilities was crystal clear to everyone. Accomplishing the mission 
through the contributions of members to a joint organization seemed to be an exercise 
in negotiating a series of cultural differences without training beforehand. 
The symbol of joint mission accomplishment is, for the US military personnel 
interviewed, the power of the United States to defeat enemies in a coordinated 
application of the strengths of the military services. Remember the pride with which 
the Army artillery officer described the other services applying their capabilities in 





experience with one service superior to the others. His account was one of pride in the 
coordination and mix of forces supporting one another in the accomplishment of the 
mission. The Naval aviator shared the same sentiment in his account of flying 
missions with other services or nationalities. Embracing diversity is how he phrased 
the power of the coordinated application of power to get the mission done. In my 
experience, these views are not unique. The joint mission is supporting one another, 
working together to prevent an enemy from harming the US and others in the military 
regardless of service. So mission is simultaneously the highest priority as indicated in 
the schema of jointness, and the ultimate experience of joint cultural negotiation as 
indicated in the schema for jointness. 
Summary: Joint Culture 
Through the experience of joint service, military members learned that the 
different military services apply formal customs and courtesies differently in the less 
formal work place. Through the experience of joint service, military members see 
past the policy and doctrine attached to the concept of “jointness” as articulated in 
law and the boxes to check on the way to promotion. In its place, service members 
discover that lived jointness is a focused appreciation of the strengths of the 
individual military services through the coordinated application of that diversity to 
accomplish the mission. All of this means that in a given joint assignment, service 
members have to figure out how to navigate the joint organization to identify people 
and processes to get things done.  
There are two cognitive structures that stand ready to enable people to 





6.1 rows 1 through 5 above), is one that enables military service personnel to navigate 
the joint assignment process. At each step along the way, service members figure out 
how to proceed to the next step. Most of the time there is little to no training prior to a 
joint assignment. A lot of the time the joint assignment may not be creditable as 
checking the box for joint duty because the assignment is coded that way. Upon 
arrival at the joint assignment, new organizations may be present with whom the 
service member may not previously worked. That organizational diversity and the 
contributions of each organization has to be learned and understood because everyone 
in the joint environment works together to get the mission done.  
The second, the schema of jointness (Figure 3 and Table 6.1 columns A 
through E above), is one that keeps service members focused on the things that 
matter. Top of the list is getting the mission done. Mission accomplishment is the 
thread that ties all of the steps of the joint assignment together. With mission in mind, 
the different organizations in the joint environment become more important than just 
a group of different customs and courtesies to learn. They can be critical to mission 
accomplishment and working with them in a holistic and cooperative way leveraging 
their strengths is important. Adaptation may be necessary especially if those partners 
in the joint environment do not share the goals for the mission. Learning how to work 
in a joint environment can mean persuading and compromising where possible. None 
of which would be possible without putting a priority on protocols that enable 
cooperation and trust and sometimes working in a way that gets the mission done 





Finally, jointness is about accomplishing the mission. Whether the mission is 
coordinating a plan with a foreign partner or coordinating a combat strike on an 
enemy position. Service members work together, professionally applying their 
service-specific knowledge, skills and abilities to accomplish the mission. The lived 
experience of joint assignments instantiates the joint cultural schemas in dynamic and 
contingent ways that are unique to the composition of the joint organization at the 
time. Joint culture is messy and complicated, but through the initiative of 
professionals, each time they join a joint organization, they figure out what to do. 
They work with people from different organizations and backgrounds. They negotiate 
protocol and processes and they learn who can do what and how all that can help 










Chapter 7: Conclusions and Directions for Future research 
The strength of anthropology is that it focuses on the real life experiences and 
perspectives of people involved in their contexts, on the ground. Participant 
observation fieldwork is the foundation of cultural anthropology (Bernard 2002: 322) 
which places the researcher in the midst of the situation being studied to acquire the 
experiential knowledge (Bernard 2002) to inform interpretations and explanations of 
social phenomena. Supported by a systematic interviewing approaches, anthropology 
reliably characterizes the dynamics of the situation that can lead to solutions to 
problems people face. This dissertation demonstrated the value of having 
anthropology study issues of importance to the military and DoD from the 
perspectives of military personnel themselves. We learned that most people do not 
really understand joint concepts. Jointness seems to the people interviewed as 
nebulous and somewhat ill-defined and any opportunity for enthusiasm is tempered 
somewhat by the lukewarm support from the services. Yet, the military personnel 
interviewed feel that joint service is important and valuable because of the insights it 
provides into the diversity of organizations and capabilities that come together in a 
joint environment. The consensus on jointness is that it is strength through diversity.  
In this dissertation we learned that the enlisted personnel interviewed served 
in a multi-service or joint assignments during their first enlistment. It is not that this is 
necessarily a problem. It is mentioned here simply to point out that it seems to be 
more of a byproduct of the way intelligence specialties are assigned by their parent 
services then an intentional implementation of General Dempsey's desire to see 





that even though those early joint assignments can be confusing, most service 
members are well-equipped with sufficient general military knowledge to adapt to 
and gradually become comfortable in the joint environment. Their singular focus on 
accomplishing the mission is a goal that guides them through the rough spots.  
Cognitive Anthropology 
 This dissertation grappled with the fluid concepts of schemas and cultural 
models in cognitive anthropology to come up with a way to depict the complexities 
that military service personnel face in joint environments. While perhaps not the most 
elegant application of existing methods, this dissertation attempted to be very clear 
about the nature of models, definitions of schemas and cultural models, and employed 
a matrix approach to illustrate the interrelationships between the major schemas 
discovered in interviewee narratives as a way to explain a cultural model of jointness. 
Also, this may be the first time cognitive anthropology has been applied in military 
anthropology research. 
In-person fieldwork, interviews and systematic text analysis are the hallmarks 
of applied anthropology generally and cognitive anthropology particularly. Applied 
anthropologists increasingly study domestic cultural settings to address any number 
of problems or concerns, in the present as well as the past. While this dissertation was 
very much in the minds of those interviewed, applied anthropology is an holistic 
discipline that can bring all the strengths of anthropology, archeology, biological 
anthropology, and socio-cultural anthropology to bear on understanding the human 
experience in all its forms. The military is an important community of Americans that 





anthropological inquiry. There is a growing body of anthropology whose interest area 
is the military community. This dissertation is on more contribution to that work. 
Military Anthropology 
The work in this dissertation makes a contribution to anthropology of the 
military by examining jointness from the perspective of military personnel who have 
lived it. A core logic framework guided a systematic navigation of the process and 
experiences of military personnel as they move through their joint assignments and 
how they navigated the cultural complexities they encountered on the way.  From 
members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines common themes emerged from 
their accounts to form cultural schemas of and for jointness. Together, the two joint 
cultural schemas form a cultural model of jointness. If any corners of the DoD think 
that jointness can still be improved, then the kind of research in this dissertation can 
be focused on any number of experiences that comprise joint service.   
Directions for future research 
 The research in this dissertation is limited in a number of ways. First, it 
includes the joint experiences of a small number of service members from four 
services and largely from the intelligence occupational specialties within those 
services. The research does not include members from the US Coast Guard or anyone 
from civilian government agencies or contractor personnel. Also, this dissertation 
does not include any of the experiences of our foreign partners. All of these 
limitations are opportunities to build on this dissertation’s conclusions by expanding 





 Any of the specific points along the continuum of a joint assignment could 
also be excellent fodder for follow-up research. From preparation and recruitment for 
joint assignments to pre-PCS training or orientations upon arrival at the joint 
assignment. How to design such training and orientations would require a greater 
depth of research. Of course on-site contrasting service cultural models of customs 
and courtesies may also be addressed in follow-on research possibly with the aid of 
the structural diversity focus in the Military Leadership Diversity Commission 
(MLDC) (see Appendix D for a description of the MLDC).  
 Joint professional military education (JPME) for both officers and enlisted 
would be another opportunity for future research. JPME has a schedule and general 
content laid out in joint policy documents for officers and enlisted personnel (see 
Appendix B). If raising the profile of JPME in terms of its value in overcoming the 
inter-service cultural differences is important, then designing supplementary JPME 







Appendix A – 10 USC Ch. 107 Professional Military Education 
 
 
From Title 10—ARMED FORCES 
Subtitle A - General Military Law  
PART III - TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
CHAPTER 107—PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
Sec.2151. Definitions 
2152. Joint professional military education: general requirements. 
2153. Capstone course: newly selected general and flag officers. 
2154. Joint professional military education: three-phase approach. 
2155. Joint professional military education Phase II program of instruction. 
2156. Joint Forces Staff College: duration of principal course of instruction. 
2157. Annual report to Congress. 
         
Prior Provisions 
A prior chapter 107 was renumbered chapter 106A of this title. 
Amendments 
2006—Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(12), (13), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 
2399, substituted "Joint professional" for "Professional" in item 2152 and "Phase" for 
"phase" in item 2155. 
§2151. Definitions 
(a) Joint Professional Military Education. —Joint professional military education 
consists of the rigorous and thorough instruction and examination of officers of the 
armed forces in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-
depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the subject matter covered. 
The subject matter to be covered by joint professional military education shall include 
at least the following: 
(1) National Military Strategy. 
(2) Joint planning at all levels of war. 
(3) Joint doctrine. 
(4) Joint command and control. 
(5) Joint force and joint requirements development. 
(6) Operational contract support. 
 
(b) Other Definitions. —In this chapter: 
(1) The term "senior level service school" means any of the following: 
(A) The Army War College. 
(B) The College of Naval Warfare. 
(C) The Air War College. 






(2) The term "intermediate level service school" means any of the following: 
(A) The United States Army Command and General Staff College. 
(B) The College of Naval Command and Staff. 
(C) The Air Command and Staff College. 
(D) The Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 
 
(3) The term "joint intermediate level school" includes the National Defense 
Intelligence College. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1897; 
amended Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(a)(2), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412; 
Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title VIII, §845(c), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1848.) 
Amendments 
2013—Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 112–239 added par. (6). 
2011—Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 112–81 added par. (3). 
Change of Name 
National Defense Intelligence College changed to National Intelligence University by 
Department of Defense Instruction 3305.01 on Feb. 9, 2011. 
§2152. Joint professional military education: general requirements 
(a) In General. —The Secretary of Defense shall implement a comprehensive 
framework for the joint professional military education of officers, including officers 
nominated under section 661 of this title for the joint specialty. 
(b) Joint Military Education Schools. —The Secretary of Defense, with the advice 
and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall periodically review 
and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense University (and of 
any other joint professional military education school) to enhance the education and 
training of officers in joint matters. The Secretary shall require such schools to 
maintain rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint 
specialty. 
(c) Other Professional Military Education Schools. —The Secretary of Defense shall 
require that each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military 
education periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate 
grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on— 
(1) joint matters; and 
(2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments. 
(Added and amended Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), (b), Oct. 28, 2004, 
118 Stat. 1897, 1900.) 
Codification 
Subsecs. (b) and (c) of section 663 of this title, which were transferred to this section 
by Pub. L. 108–375, §532(b), were based on Pub. L. 99–433, title IV, §401(a), Oct. 1, 
1986, 100 Stat. 1027. 
Amendments 
2004—Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 108–375, §532(b), transferred subsecs. (b) and (c) of 
section 663 of this title to end of this section. See Codification note above. 
§2153. Capstone course: newly selected general and flag officers 
(a) Requirement. —Each officer selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier 





such selection, to attend a military education course designed specifically to prepare 
new general and flag officers to work with the other armed forces. 
(b) Waiver Authority. —(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense may 
waive subsection (a)— 
(A) in the case of an officer whose immediately previous assignment was in a joint 
duty assignment and who is thoroughly familiar with joint matters; 
(B) when necessary for the good of the service; 
(C) in the case of an officer whose proposed selection for promotion is based 
primarily upon scientific and technical qualifications for which joint requirements do 
not exist (as determined under regulations prescribed under section 619(e)(4) 1 of this 
title); and 
(D) in the case of a medical officer, dental officer, veterinary officer, medical service 
officer, nurse, biomedical science officer, or chaplain. 
 
(2) The authority of the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver under paragraph (1) 
may only be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of 
Defense, or an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Such a waiver may be granted only on 
a case-by-case basis in the case of an individual officer. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1897.) 
References in Text 
Section 619(e)(4) of this title, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(C), was repealed by Pub. 
L. 103–160, div. A, title IX, §931(b), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1734. See section 
619a(f) of this title. 
1 See References in Text note below. 
§2154. Joint professional military education: three-phase approach 
(a) Three-Phase Approach. —The Secretary of Defense shall implement a three-phase 
approach to joint professional military education, as follows: 
(1) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of 
Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
Phase I instruction, consisting of all the elements of a joint professional military 
education (as specified in section 2151(a) of this title), in addition to the principal 
curriculum taught to all officers at an intermediate level service school or at a joint 
intermediate level school. 
(2) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of 
Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
Phase II instruction, consisting of— 
(A) a joint professional military education curriculum taught in residence at, or 
offered through, the Joint Forces Staff College or a senior level service school that 
has been designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional 
military education institution; or 
(B) a senior level service course of at least ten months that has been designated and 
certified by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education course. 
 
(3) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of 
Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 





general or, in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower half) and offered in 
accordance with section 2153 of this title. 
 
(b) Sequenced Approach. —The Secretary shall require the sequencing of joint 
professional military education so that the standard sequence of assignments for such 
education requires an officer to complete Phase I instruction before proceeding to 
Phase II instruction, as provided in section 2155(a) of this title. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1898; 
amended Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(a)(1), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412; 
Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title V, §506, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3356; Pub. L. 114–
92, div. A, title V, §554, Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 824.) 
Amendments 
2015—Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 114–92 inserted ", or offered through," after "taught 
in residence at". 
2014—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 113–291 substituted "consisting of—" for "consisting 
of a joint professional military education curriculum taught in residence at—" in 
introductory provisions, added subpars. (A) and (B), and struck out former subpars. 
(A) and (B) which read as follows: 
"(A) the Joint Forces Staff College; or 
"(B) a senior level service school that has been designated and certified by the 
Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education institution." 
2011—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 112–81 inserted "or at a joint intermediate level 
school" before period at end. 
§2155. Joint professional military education Phase II program of instruction 
(a) Prerequisite of Completion of Joint Professional Military Education Phase I 
Program of Instruction. — (1) After September 30, 2009, an officer of the armed 
forces may not be accepted for, or assigned to, a program of instruction designated by 
the Secretary of Defense as joint professional military education Phase II unless the 
officer has successfully completed a program of instruction designated by the 
Secretary of Defense as joint professional military education Phase I. 
(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may grant exceptions to the requirement 
under paragraph (1). Such an exception may be granted only on a case-by-case basis 
under exceptional circumstances, as determined by the Chairman. An officer selected 
to receive such an exception shall have knowledge of joint matters and other aspects 
of the Phase I curriculum that, to the satisfaction of the Chairman, qualifies the officer 
to meet the minimum requirements established for entry into Phase II instruction 
without first completing Phase I instruction. The number of officers selected to attend 
an offering of the principal course of instruction at the Joint Forces Staff College or a 
senior level service school designated by the Secretary of Defense as a joint 
professional military education institution who have not completed Phase I instruction 
should comprise no more than 10 percent of the total number of officers selected. 
(b) Phase II Requirements. —The Secretary shall require that the curriculum for 
Phase II joint professional military education at any school— 
(1) focus on developing joint operational expertise and perspectives and honing joint 
warfighting skills; and 





(A) so as to adequately prepare students to perform effectively in an assignment to a 
joint, multiservice organization; and 
(B) so that students progress from a basic knowledge of joint matters learned in Phase 
I instruction to the level of expertise necessary for successful performance in the joint 
arena. 
 
(c) Curriculum Content. —In addition to the subjects specified in section 2151(a) of 
this title, the curriculum for Phase II joint professional military education shall 
include the following: 
(1) National security strategy. 
(2) Theater strategy and campaigning. 
(3) Joint planning processes and systems. 
(4) Joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those 
capabilities. 
 
(d) Student Ratio; Faculty Ratio. —Not later than September 30, 2009, for courses of 
instruction in a Phase II program of instruction that is offered at senior level service 
school that has been designated by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional 
military education institution— 
(1) the percentage of students enrolled in any such course who are officers of the 
armed force that administers the school may not exceed 60 percent, with the 
remaining services proportionally represented; and 
(2) of the faculty at the school who are active-duty officers who provide instruction in 
such courses, the percentage who are officers of the armed force that administers the 
school may not exceed 60 percent, with the remaining services proportionally 
represented. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1898; 
amended Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(13), (14), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 
2399.) 
Amendments 
2006—Pub. L. 109–364, §1071(a)(13), substituted "Phase" for "phase" in section 
catchline. 
Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109–364, §1071(a)(14), inserted "Phase" after "Education" in 
heading. 
Pilot Program on JPME Phase II on Other Than In-Residence Basis 
Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(b), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412, provided that: 
"(1) Pilot program authorized. —The Secretary of Defense may carry out a pilot 
program to assess the feasibility and advisability of offering a program of instruction 
for Phase II joint professional military education (JPME II) on another than in-
residence basis. 
"(2) Location. —The pilot program authorized by this subsection shall be carried out 
at the headquarters of not more than two combatant commands selected by the 
Secretary for purposes of the pilot program. 
"(3) Program of instruction. —The program of instruction offered under the pilot 
program authorized by this subsection shall meet the requirements of section 2155 of 





"(4) Report. —Not later than one year before completion of the pilot program 
authorized by this subsection, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the pilot 
program. The report shall include the following: 
"(A) The number of students enrolled at each location under the pilot program. 
"(B) The number of students who successfully completed the program of instruction 
under the pilot program and were awarded credit for Phase II joint professional 
military education. 
"(C) The assessment of the Secretary regarding the feasibility and advisability of 
expanding the pilot program to the headquarters of additional combatant commands, 
or of making the pilot program permanent, and a statement of the legislative or 
administrative actions required to implement such assessment. 
"(5) Sunset. —The authority in this subsection to carry out the pilot program shall 
expire on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 
31, 2011]." 
§2156. Joint Forces Staff College: duration of principal course of instruction 
(a) Duration. —The duration of the principal course of instruction offered at the Joint 
Forces Staff College may not be less than 10 weeks of resident instruction. 
(b) Definition. —In this section, the term "principal course of instruction" means any 
course of instruction offered at the Joint Forces Staff College as Phase II joint 
professional military education. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1900.) 
§2157. Annual report to Congress 
The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual report of the Secretary to 
Congress under section 113(c) of this title, for the period covered by the report, the 
following information (which shall be shown for the Department of Defense as a 
whole and separately for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and each 
reserve component): 
(1) The number of officers who successfully completed a joint professional military 
education Phase II course and were not selected for promotion. 
(2) The number of officer students and faculty members assigned by each service to 
the professional military schools of the other services and to the joint schools. 
(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1900; 
amended Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(15), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 
2399.) 
Amendments 






Appendix B – Officer and Enlisted JPME Schedules 
 
Table B.1: Officer JPME Schedule from CJCSI 1800.01E 29 May 2015, Annex 
A, Appendix A 
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Understanding security environment and instruments of national security 
Anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty 
Anticipating and recognizing change and leading transitions 
Operating in intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding 
Making ethical decisions based on the profession of arms 






Table B.2: Enlisted Professional Military Education (EPME) Continuum from 
CJCSI 1805.01B 15 May 2015, Annex A, Appendix A 
Grade/Rank E1-E3  E4-E6 E6-E7 E8-E9 E9 
Education 
Level 

































































































































































Grade/Rank E1-E3  E4-E6 E6-E7 E8-E9 E9 
Education 
Level 









• National Military Capabilities 
• Joint Forces Overview 
• Joint Forces Non-
Commissioned and Petty 
Officer 




• National Strategic 
Overview 
• JIIM 
• Foundations of Joint 
Operations 














Grade/Rank E1-E3  E4-E6 E6-E7 E8-E9 E9 
Education 
Level 
Introductory Primary Intermediate Senior Executive 





• National Strategic 
Overview 
• National Military 
Capabilities and 
Organization 
• Foundations of Joint 
Operations 
• Joint Forces Overview 
• Regional Knowledge and 
Operational Culture 










t – Enlisted 
Desired 
Leader 
Operate on commander’s intent and enable mission command at all levels 
Make sound ethical decisions based on the values and standards of the profession 
of arms 
Utilize available resources to enhance the discipline, readiness, resiliency, and 





Grade/Rank E1-E3  E4-E6 E6-E7 E8-E9 E9 
Education 
Level 
Introductory Primary Intermediate Senior Executive 
Attributes 
(EDLAs) 
Anticipate, communicate, and mitigate risks 
Operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments 








Appendix C – The Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
Semi-structured interview questions 
 
Each participant was instructed as follows:  
 
Please answer the following questions based on your experience and 
what you think and believe. Questions in parentheses are reminders to me for 
possible follow up or elaboration. 
1. (Causes) How did you come to be assigned to joint duty? (Did you 
volunteer or were you compelled to go?)   
 
2. (Causes) How did your parent service talk about joint assignments? (In 
other words, did the service encourage and emphasize possible rewards 
following. joint duty or did you perceive that was it tolerated as a necessary 
evil?)  
 
3. (Causes) How did your parent service formally prepare you for duty in a 
joint environment pre-pcs (pcs means permanent change of station – the 
universal term used in the military to mean moving to a new duty station)? 
(Were there training or orientation sessions prior to the assignment addressing 
the different service perspectives? What about different US government 
agency perspectives? How about different nationalities, both allied, host 
nation and even adversary nationalities?  
Topics to explore are:  
a. rank and authority differences – vertical treatment as well as 
horizontal affiliations at the same rank 
b. gender differences – how do the different institutions relate to 
men and women especially when it comes to matters of 
information and expertise sharing? 
c. language differences – both in terms of US English military 
jargon, US bureaucratic terminology, and foreign language 
concepts and the use of translators. norms of official and 




4. (Effects) Were there any training or orientation sessions addressing joint 
duty for you upon arrival at the joint duty station? (If so, were they provided 






5. (Effects) Were the messages the same or different from the pre-pcs training 
or orientation sessions? 
 
6. (Effects) How did any differences show up on duty?   
 
7. (Impacts) How did the reality of joint duty compare to your expectations?     
 
8. (Impacts) What were the most memorable instances of difference and 
similarity between joint duty and parent service duty? 
 
9. (Impacts) How did the experience of joint duty affect your perspective on 
joint duty? (How were you recognized or rewarded for joint duty?) 
 
10. (Adaptations) Have you perceived any changes in the way your parent 
service approaches (recruits, assigns, trains, advocates for, rewards) joint 
duty? 
 
11. (Adaptations) Would you recommend joint duty to others in your parent 
service? (Why or why not?)      
 
12. (Adaptations) Do you think joint duty is important (Why/why not?)  
 







Appendix D – The Military Leadership Diversity Commission 
 
The Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), established by the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2009, was tasked “to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape 
diversity among military leaders” (MLDC 2011: 3).  The commission developed a 
four-dimensional model of diversity (MLDC 2011: 16-17): 
1. Demographic diversity – immutable differences among individuals, 
such as race/ethnicity, gender and age as well as differences in 
personal background, such as religion, education level and marital 
status. A critical component of overall diversity. By adding cultural 
and linguistic knowledge from a variety of demographic backgrounds, 
the US military is likely to “know the enemy” better and be better able 
to work with international partners. 
2. Cognitive diversity – different personality types, such as 
extroverted/introverted, and to different thinking styles, such as quick 
and decisive versus slow and methodical.  
3. Structural diversity – organizational background differences, including 
Service, occupation, component (i.e., Active or Reserve), and work 
function. It provides the expertise of service members affiliated with 
particular occupations, Services, or components. It also enables needed 
capabilities to be brought to the table and fully incorporated into the 





branches or occupations can result in innovative ways of confronting 
the threat. 
4. Global diversity – occurs through contact with those (e.g., members of 
foreign military services) who have national affiliations with countries 






Appendix E – Different Military Service Cognitive Styles Toward Analysis 
(Direct block quotations from Builder 1989: 104-109)  
 
• “Air Force – approach to analysis is sophisticated and elegant  
o The Air Force has relied upon analysis from its inception to support 
operational, developmental, and acquisition decision making at high 
levels.  
o The airplane, the focal instrument of the theory of air power and 
independent air forces, was itself conceived and born by means of 
requirements analysis.  
o The father of the Air Force, Hap Arnold, took a bold step to ensure 
that the new institution could retain in peacetime some of the benefits 
afforded by its wartime scientists and operations analysts. 
o Air Force officers are accustomed to dealing with analysis on every 
aspect of flight and the application of air power. 
o Supporting decisions with analysis is quite natural. 
o Analysis in the Air Force is not restricted to the formalized planning, 
programming, and budgeting process; it is often regarded as the most 
effective medium for debate within the Air Force itself. 
• Army – approach to analysis is ingenuous and credulous 
o Army analyses are oriented toward feeding numbers to the planning, 
programming, and budgeting process 






o Detail and scope are prized, even at the expense of clarity or 
understanding. 
o The Army appears to have an implicit faith in the analysis and 
analysts. 
o The stature of an analyst seems to rest upon the number of factors 
taken into account, the amount of detail included, and the number and 
credentials of the analysts who did the work. 
o Less clear is whether that faith rests with the validity of such 
requirements analyses or with their effectiveness in feeding credible 
(i.e. acceptable) numbers into the bureaucratic programming process. 
o Much of Army analysis appears to be aimed at getting a single answer 
rather than illuminating the alternatives in the face of recognized 
uncertainties.  
o Does the Army believe in the results or believe in the technique as a 
device to keep the Department of Defense satisfied? 
• Navy – approach to analysis is suspicious and pragmatic 
o Has been at the forefront of operations analysis – to improve the 
tactical or operational use of its existing platforms or forces. 
o Has little tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the Navy, by 
either requirements or systems analyses. 
o Analysis of naval force requirements or effectiveness is a direct threat 





o The Navy does not need analysis to define its requirements; it has 
always known what its requirements were. 
o Navy requirements come from its experience and traditions, and from 
the quality thinking of its people, well steeped in both.  
o Navy institutional judgments are infallible. If analysis gave results that 
were contrary to those judgments, then, very simply, the analysis must 
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